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The purpose of this study was to analyze the frequency of general aviation airplane
accidents and accident rates on the basis of aircraft certification to determine whether or
not differences in aircraft certification rules had an influence on accidents. In addition,
the narrative cause descriptions contained within the accident reports were analyzed to
determine whether there were differences in the qualitative data for the different
certification categories. The certification categories examined were: Federal Aviation
Regulations Part 23, Civil Air Regulations 3, Light Sport Aircraft, and
Experimental-Amateur Built. The accident causes examined were those classified as:
Loss of Control, Controlled Flight into Terrain, Engine Failure, and Structural Failure.
Airworthiness certification categories represent a wide diversity of government
oversight. Part 23 rules have evolved from the initial set of simpler design standards and
have progressed into a comprehensive and strict set of rules to address the safety issues of
the more complex airplanes within the category. Experimental-Amateur Built airplanes
have the least amount of government oversight and are the fastest growing segment. The
Light Sport Aircraft category is a more recent certification category that utilizes
consensus standards in the approval process. Civil Air Regulations 3 airplanes were

iii

designed and manufactured under simpler rules but modifying these airplanes has
become lengthy and expensive.
The study was conducted using a mixed methods methodology which involves
both quantitative and qualitative elements. A Chi-Square test was used for a quantitative
analysis of the accident frequency among aircraft certification categories. Accident rate
analysis of the accidents among aircraft certification categories involved an ANCOVA
test. The qualitative component involved the use of text mining techniques for the
analysis of the narrative cause descriptions contained within the accident reports.
The Chi-Square test indicated that there was no significant difference in the
number of accidents among the different certification categories when either Controlled
Flight into Terrain or Structural Failure was listed as cause. However, there was a
significant difference in the frequency of accidents with regard to Loss of Control and
Engine Failure accidents. The results of the ANCOVA test indicated that there was no
significant difference in the accident rate with regard to Loss of Control, Controlled
Flight into Terrain, or Structural Failure accidents. There was, however, a significant
difference in Engine Failure accidents between Experimental-Amateur Built and the other
categories.
The text mining analysis of the narrative causes of Loss of Control accidents
indicated that only the Civil Air Regulations 3 category airplanes had clusters of words
associated with visual flight into instrument meteorological conditions. Civil Air
Regulations 3 airplanes were designed and manufactured prior to the 1960s and in most
cases have not been retrofitted to take advantage of newer technologies that could help
prevent Loss of Control accidents.
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The study indicated that General Aviation aircraft certification rules do not have a
statistically significant effect on aircraft accidents except for Loss of Control and Engine
Failure. According to the literature, government oversight could have become an
obstacle in the implementation of safety enhancing equipment that could reduce Loss of
Control accidents. Oversight should focus on ensuring that Experimental-Amateur Built
aircraft owners perform a functional test that could prevent some of the Engine Failure
accidents.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Aviation in the United States is an extremely important element of our national
and international stature. Indeed, aviation undergirds all political, economic, and military
elements of our society. For example, the U.S. is recognized as the world leader in
aircraft manufacturing that includes the manufacture of general aviation (GA) aircraft.
There are more GA aircraft in the U.S. than the rest of the world combined (National
Research Council, 2006).
The methods of aircraft certification used in the U.S. have become respected the
world over. These oversight methods for aircraft production and service have led to
many economic opportunities for U.S. aircraft manufacturers because of the high quality
of products that have resulted. This is particularly important for large aircraft
manufacturers such as the Boeing Company. However, one segment of the aircraft
manufacturing landscape has suffered. The production of general aviation, entry-level
aircraft1 has declined largely due to changes in small aircraft certification regulations
(Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], 2009).
Aircraft certification regulations are intended to ensure the airworthiness of
aircraft by requiring manufacturers of aircraft and aircraft components to comply with
approved aircraft designs, maintenance requirements, and operational limitations. The
main objective of aircraft certification and continued airworthiness requirements is to
increase the reliability of safety critical systems (Committee on Aircraft Certification
1

In the context of this study, entry-level aircraft or airplane means an aircraft that might
be used or acquired in the beginning of an  individual’s flying experience.
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Safety Management [CACSM], 1998). While strict certification requirements represent
high standards for aircraft manufacturers, in the last three decades new GA aircraft
certification costs have increased, the number of GA aircraft produced has decreased, and
there have been no accompanying substantial changes in operational safety or accident
rates (Bowles, 2010).
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations that  govern  today’s  
aircraft are found in Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) (FAA, 2013c).
Airworthiness and certification standards for airplanes in the normal, utility, and
aerobatic categories with a maximum certificated takeoff weight of 12,500 pounds or less
are contained within 14 CFR Part 23 (Part 23) regulations (FAA, 2013c).
According to 2009 data of the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), the
U.S. civil aviation manufacturing industry that produces civilian aircraft, engines, and
parts recorded a positive trade balance of over $75 billion. In 2009, civil aviation
supported over 10 million jobs and contributed $1.3 trillion in total economic activity to
the U.S. economy, accounting for 5.2% of U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (FAA,
2011c). GA’s  overall contribution to the U.S. economy was 0.3% of the U.S. GDP and
GA aircraft manufacturing alone contributed 0.1% of the U.S. GDP (FAA, 2011c). For
the U.S. to maintain its competitive edge worldwide, the certification process for
aerospace products has to be dynamic, adapt to change, leverage new technologies, and
both facilitate and encourage new knowledge.
Since the 1980s, the regulatory scope of Part 23 has been shifted to address more
complex aircraft, placing an excessive burden on the certification of simpler aircraft
(FAA, 2009). In 2009, the FAA began a Part 23 Certification Process Study (CPS) to
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assess the adequacy of the current certification and airworthiness standards processes
(FAA, 2009). Following the recommendations of the CPS in August 2011, the FAA
created a Part 23 Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) (FAA, 2011b). The ARC was
tasked with completely restructuring Part 23 and with sub-dividing the category into tiers
based on airplane performance and complexity, as opposed to the existing weight and
propulsion classifications, thereby allowing the FAA to target the required regulations
and oversight specifically to each tier as necessary (FAA, 2009, p. 15). Tasking for the
ARC also included a re-write of the regulations on a broad, general, and progressive
level. The ARC meetings were concluded in January of 2013; the recommendations of
the ARC were submitted to the FAA in May of 2013 (Pompeo, 2013), and a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) is expected to be issued in 2014 (FAA, 2011b). One of
the recommendations from the ARC is to develop a set of industry consensus standards
that will become the means of compliance for the certification approval process of the
new Part 23 regulations (Part 23 ARC, 2012). As a result of the ARC meetings, a new
GA aircraft certification chapter was created within an international consensus standards
organization, American Standards for Testing and Materials (ASTM), ASTM F44.
The use of industry consensus standards is consistent with Public Law 104-113,
also known as the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995
(NTTAA), signed by President Clinton in March 1996. NTTAA encourages federal
agencies in the U.S. to utilize standards developed by voluntary consensus standards
bodies rather than government-unique standards, wherever possible. The Act also
includes provisions that encourage federal agencies to partner with the private sector in
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the development of these standards to help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of
government (National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act, 1996).
In the early 2000s, GA advocacy groups, such as the Experimental Aircraft
Association (EAA) and the General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA),
became concerned with rising certification costs and dwindling pilot populations. As a
result, these advocacy groups petitioned the FAA to apply NTTAA to an aviation case.
In 2004, the FAA initiated a test case with the certification of a new aircraft category,
Light Sport Aircraft (LSA), utilizing consensus standards (Bowles, 2010). Two
categories within the LSA class were created: Special-Light Sport Aircraft (S-LSA) and
Experimental-Light Sport Aircraft (E-LSA). ASTM was chosen for the implementation
and management of the LSA industry consensus standards. Early indicators show that
this new category has been a success; thus, the propagation of consensus standards to
more mainstream uses has become an appealing option applicable to other segments of
aviation (FAA, 2009).
Part 23 airplanes have been essential in pilot flight training. However,  “[a]
consequence of the difficult regulatory environment has been the high cost of
certification and a corresponding reduction of new entry-level products  within  part  23”  
(FAA, 2009, p. 15). The few new certified entry-level airplanes that are produced come
at a very high cost due to the lengthy and expensive certification requirements. As a
result, the existing flight training fleet of airplanes is composed of aircraft produced
decades ago (GAMA, 2012). Retrofitting these old aircraft with new technologies would
involve a lengthy and expensive re-certification process, which inhibits many pilots from
taking advantage of new technologies. In 2008, the average age of piston aircraft with
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seating capacities of one-to-three seats was 48 years, and the average age for four-seat
aircraft was 38 years (GAMA, 2012). As a result, most pilots currently learn to fly in
30-year old Cessnas and Pipers or in newer aircraft that were designed and received
initial certification over 30 years ago. Due to the stringent Part 23 regulatory
requirements, these older aircraft designs cannot accommodate the new safety
technologies that have become common such as Ballistic Recovery Parachutes (BRS) and
air bags (FAA, 2009). Over the last two decades, the U.S. active pilot population has
been in decline, with an average decline of 10,000 pilots per year (GAMA, 2012). The
reduction in the active pilot population is a growing concern, as many experts predict a
worldwide pilot shortage (Boeing, 2012). “Over  the  last  decade  the  number  of  active  
private  pilots  has  been  declining  and  the  number  of  new  pilot  starts  hasn’t  kept  pace.    
Revitalizing the entry-level airplane market can have a beneficial effect on attracting new
pilots  in  the  safest  manner  possible”  (FAA,  2009,  p.  19).    
As of 2013, there were 13 aircraft manufacturers of Part 23 certified two-seat or
four-seat piston aircraft in the U.S. (GAMA, 2012); most of these Part 23 aircraft
manufacturers have been in operation for over 30 years. Since the creation of the LSA
category in 2004, 20 new U.S. manufacturers of LSA aircraft have emerged (Johnson,
2013). The pilot population has increased by 4,066 pilots since 2004, when the new LSA
rules were implemented. This figure represents an important contribution to an industry
in which the total active pilot population has been dwindling over the last decade
(GAMA, 2012). Part 23 has also been the entry point for many new aircraft technologies,
including composite materials, satellite navigation and approaches, integrated glass
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cockpits, synthetic vision, and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B),
among others (Bowles, 2010).
The Experimental-Amateur Built (E-AB) category constitutes the fastest growing
segment of the GA fleet in the U.S. (U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO],
2012). E-AB aircraft are defined by the FAA as aircraft in which at least 51% of the
aircraft was fabricated and assembled by an individual or group of individuals and
undertook the construction project solely for their own education or recreation. In 2011,
there were approximately 33,000 E-AB aircraft registered, a 10% increase from 2008,
making E-AB aircraft the fastest growing segment of the GA fleet (National
Transportation Safety Board [NTSB], 2012a). On the other hand, the number of
accidents involving E-AB aircraft has increased since 1999 through 2011; E-AB aircraft
accounted for 14% of airplanes in nonfatal GA accidents and approximately 21% of fatal
accidents. Many of the accidents involving E-AB aircraft occurred during the first 50
hours of flight, known as the flight test period (NTSB, 2012b).
Revitalizing the entry-level airplane market could have a beneficial effect on
attracting new pilots, invigorating the manufacturing industry, and facilitating the retrofit
of an aging fleet of over 200,000 airplanes. The use of international industry consensus
standards for aircraft certification may be an appealing alternative for the U.S. to
maintain the competitive edge in a globalized marketplace.
Significance of the Study
The significance of the study was to shed new light on the relationship that
various aircraft certification processes have to GA aircraft accidents. The aircraft
certification categories used in the study included:
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(a) Civil Air Regulations 3 (CAR 3)2, these rules are the preceding set of rules
before Part 23 rules were implemented;
(b) E-AB, these rules have the least amount of government oversight and is the
fastest growing segment in GA;
(c) LSA, these rules are ones that reflect industry consensus standards; and
(d) Part 23, these rules are the current certification rules for GA aircraft and have
become increasingly stricter to address the safety concerns of the more complex
airplanes within the category.
Piston airplanes, most of which are currently regulated by Part 23 rules, account
for over 60% of the civil aircraft fleet. Most of these are GA airplanes that have been
essential both in pilot flight training and as the entry point for many new aircraft
technologies. While strict certification requirements represent high standards for aircraft
manufacturers, Part 23 rules have been shifting since 1980 to address more complex
airplanes. As a result, aircraft certification costs have increased while the overall
accident rate in GA has remained relatively steady. It is important, therefore, to study the
impact of certification standards on GA accidents.
Statement of the Problem
Aircraft certification under Part 23 has grown out of the initial set of design
standards that began back in the 1920s. The relatively simple regulations known as
CAR 3 evolved into increasingly comprehensive rules to both address safety issues that
emerged with the growing number of aircraft in service and to deal with the increasing
complexity due to the incorporation of new technologies. These new more stringent rules
2

CAR 3 airplanes for this study also included airplanes certified under CAR 4a, and Aeronautics Bulletin
No. 7
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were also applicable to modifications of existing airplanes, making the retrofit and the
application of new technologies to an existing and aging GA fleet difficult and expensive
(FAA, 2009; General Aviation Joint Steering Committee [GAJSC], 2012).
In 2013, Part 23 consists of a large body of regulatory material that relies on a
system of overlapping Advisory Circulars (ACs) and, to a lesser extent, industry
standards to define safety requirements. A significant portion of the regulations are so
prescriptive that airplane manufacturers are inhibited from finding more efficient and
economical methods of compliance with acceptable levels of safety (Part 23 ARC, 2012).
ACs provide interpretations of the regulations as well as a means of compliance;
however, ACs are meant to provide guidance and are not regulatory in nature. In
practice, it has been found that in some cases that the means of compliance presented in
ACs have been treated as the only acceptable means of compliance. By incorporating
very specific technical requirements, Part 23 rules have become very prescriptive in
nature. The introduction of new technologies has become very difficult because
implementing the new technologies often requires a rule change, which is a very lengthy
process (Part 23 ARC, 2012).
One of the recommendations from the Part 23 ARC is to maintain only very basic
performance-based safety requirements within the Part 23 regulations, while removing
the prescriptive methods and technology dependent guidance from the FARs, by
changing the methods of compliance to industry consensus standards. In addition, the
use of industry consensus standards has the potential of simplifying the retrofit of older
airplanes, as these standards can be easily updated when new technologies become
available without the need for special conditions, equivalent methods of compliance, or
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exemptions (Part 23 ARC, 2012). Currently, the LSA category approval process utilizes
industry consensus standards (ASTM, 2012).
According to the NTSB (2012a), the accident rate for both fatal and non-fatal
accidents has remained relatively steady in the last ten years. GA comprises a wide range
of operations and aircraft. The majority of GA accidents involve personal flying in fixedwing airplanes (NTSB, 2012a). The three leading causes of fatal accidents in GA are
Loss of Control (LOC), Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT), and System/Component
Failure or Malfunction /Powerplant (Stephens, 2012).
It is important to explore whether the government oversight within the different
GA airworthiness certification categories has had an effect on the prevention or reduction
of aircraft accidents. It is also important to research whether government oversight might
have become an obstacle in the certification of new aviation products or on the adoption
of new technologies into old airplanes.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this study was to analyze the frequency of GA airplane accidents
and accident rates on the basis of aircraft certification to determine whether or not
differences in aircraft certification rules had an influence on accidents. In addition, the
narrative cause descriptions contained within the accident reports were analyzed to
determine whether there were differences in the qualitative data for the different
certification categories. The certification categories examined were: Part 23, CAR 3,
LSA, and E-AB. The top three causes of fatal GA accidents were of interest to this
study; in addition, Structural Failure accidents were also of interest, as Structural Failure
is one of the failures or malfunctions that aircraft certification is designed to prevent. The
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accident causes examined were those listed as: LOC, CFIT, Engine Failure, and
Structural Failure in the time period between January 1, 2004, and December 31, 2011.
Hypotheses
Eight main hypotheses were studied. These hypotheses were:
H01: There is no significant difference in the frequency of accidents among
airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard
to accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011.
H02: There is no significant difference in the frequency of accidents among
airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard
to accidents in which CFIT was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011.
H03: There is no significant difference in the frequency of accidents among
airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard
to accidents in which Engine Failure was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011.
H04: There is no significant difference in the frequency of accidents among
airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard
to accidents in which Structural Failure was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011.
H05: There is no significant difference in the accident rate among airplanes
certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard to
accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011.
H06: There is no significant difference in the accident rate among airplanes
certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard to
accidents in which CFIT was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011.
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H07: There is no significant difference in the accident rate among airplanes
certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard to
accidents in which Engine Failure was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011.
H08: There is no significant difference in the accident rate among airplanes
certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard to
accidents in which Structural Failure was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011.
Delimitations
The entry-level airplanes within Part 23 have been identified by the FAA (2009)
as being the most affected by the increased difficulty and cost of certification. Aircraft
certified under Part 23 are limited to a passenger seating capacity of nine or less, except
for the commuter aircraft within Part 23 that have a maximum passenger seating capacity
of 19 passengers. In order to compare airplane accidents based on certification basis, Part
23, CAR 3, S-LSA, E-LSA and E-AB, the complexities and missions of these aircraft
have to be comparable; therefore, this study focused on studying accidents involving
airplanes defined as fixed-wing, single-engine, reciprocating-piston airplanes. By
limiting the type of operation to non-commercial operations or FAR Part 91 operations
that include personal use and flight instruction, the missions of the airplanes utilized in
the study were similar. The time period selected was between January 1, 2004, and
December 31, 2011, in order to include the LSA category that was created in 2004.
Limitations and Assumptions
One of the major limitations with GA activity data is that the number of hours
flown per year and other activity information is obtained from the GA survey (GAO,
2012). Despite the FAA’s  efforts  to  improve  the GA survey over the years, the survey
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has some limitations because the data collected are provided voluntarily from aircraft
owners and operators. In order to maintain a more accurate count of the number of active
aircraft, in 2010 the FAA began requiring owners and operators of aircraft to renew
aircraft registrations every three years (GAO, 2012).
This research focused on comparing the frequency of aircraft accidents and
accident rates, involving fixed-wing single-engine reciprocating-piston airplanes based
on the following airworthiness certification categories: Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA, E-LSA,
and E-AB categories. Accident rates are the preferred measure to compare aircraft
accidents because they account for the amount of activity; however, the number of hours
flown per year, which is necessary to calculate accident rate, is only given for
Part 23/CAR 3 and S-LSA/E-LSA categories grouped together. Therefore, an alternative
method was also selected; this alternative method consisted of comparing the frequency
of accidents for each of the categories separately, including Part 23 and CAR 3, utilizing
a Chi-Square test.
The Chi-Square test compares the observed and expected frequencies; the test
determines if the expected values differ significantly from the observed values, but it
does not account for the amount of activity among airworthiness categories. Since the
LSA category is relatively new and there were no accidents in 2004 and very few
accidents in 2005, some of the expected frequencies for the Chi-Square test had values of
less than five. To solve this problem, the S-LSA and E-LSA categories were grouped
together and it was necessary to segregate the data into two-year segments covering the
period from 2004 to 2011. Since the sample size was large the approximation of the Chi-
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Square distribution improves and the low expected counts are not as problematic (Field,
2009).
Pilot proficiency could be a contributing factor in GA aircraft accidents,
especially in E-AB airplanes (FAA, 2011a). Pilot  proficiency  is  defined  as:  “the  state  of  
performing a given skill with expert correctness" (Soaring Safety Foundation [SSF], n.d.,
para. 2). However, pilot proficiency is not listed as a variable in the NTSB database
because it can be a subjective measure. An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) statistical
test with covariates, also known as Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA), was utilized for
the study. To take pilot experience into account, the number of total hours of flight time
of the pilot was used as a covariate.
Definition of Terms
14 CFR Part 23

Part 23 within Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations
contains airworthiness and certification standards for
airplanes in the normal, utility, and aerobatic categories,
with a maximum certificated takeoff weight of 12,500
pounds or less (FAA, 2012).

Aircraft

Device that is used or intended to be used for flight in the
air, it includes airplanes, helicopters, gliders among others
(FAA, 2012).

Airplane

Engine-driven fixed-wing aircraft, heavier than air that are
supported in flight by the dynamic reaction of the air
against its wings (FAA, 2012).

Certification Basis

The certification basis identifies the applicable standards to
which the Applicant must show compliance. It also includes
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the need for special conditions, exemptions, and equivalent
safety findings, if any. An issues list should be included to
highlight those special requirements needing resolution and
other areas that may be significant, even though they may not
warrant a special condition, exemption, or equivalent safety
finding (Aerospace Industries Association [AIA], GAMA &
FAA, 2004).
Entry-level airplane

In the context of this study, entry-level aircraft or airplane
means an aircraft that one might use or acquire in the
beginning of their flying experience.

General Aviation

All non-military aviation operations other than scheduled
air services and air transport for remuneration or hire.
These operations include flight instruction, business,
personal, and aerial work among others (Wensveen, 2007).

Pilot proficiency

“[T]he state of performing a given skill with expert
correctness." (SSF, n.d., para. 2).

List of Acronyms
14 CFR

Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations

AC

Advisory Circular

ACO

Aircraft Certification Office

ACPRR/ARC Aircraft Certification Process Review and Reform/Aviation
Rulemaking Committee
AD

Airworthiness Directive

ADS-B

Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
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AIA

Aerospace Industries Association

AIAA

American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics

AIR

Aircraft Certification Service

ANCOVA

Analysis of Covariance

ANOVA

Analysis of Variance

AOA

Angle of Attack

ARC

Aviation Rulemaking Committee

ASME

American Society for Mechanical Engineers

ASTM

American Society of Testing and Materials

ASTM F44

American Society of Testing and Materials Chapter F44

BRS

Ballistic Recovery Parachutes

CAA

Civil Aeronautics Authority

CACSM

Committee on Aircraft Certification Safety Management

CAR

Civil Air Regulation

CAR 3

Civil Air Regulation 3

CFI

Certified Flight Instructor

CFIT

Controlled Flight into Terrain

CFR

Code of Federal Regulations

CPS

Certification Process Study

DER

Designated Engineering Representative

DoD

Department of Defense

DOT

Department of Transportation

EAA

Experimental Aircraft Association
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E-AB

Experimental-Amateur Built

EAC

Eclipse Aviation Corporation

EIA/GEIA

Electronic Industries Alliance/Government Electronics and
Information Technology Association

E-LSA

Experimental-Light Sport Aircraft

FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

FAR

Federal Aviation Regulations

FAWG

Future of Aerospace Working Group

GA

General Aviation

GAJSC

General Aviation Joint Steering Committee

GAMA

General Aviation Manufacturers Association

GAO

Government Accountability Office

GARA

General Aviation Revitalization Act

GDP

Gross Domestic Product

GPS

Global Positioning System

ICAO

International Civil Aviation Organization

ICAT

International Center for Air Transportation

IEEE

Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers

IFR

Instrument Flight Rules

IMC

Instrument Meteorological Conditions

IPC

Institute for Printed Circuits

ISO

International Organization for Standardization

LOC

Loss of Control

LSA

Light Sport Aircraft
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LTSP

Light-Sport Special Category (NTSB database variable name)

MIDO

Manufacturing Inspection District Office

Mil-specs

Military-specifications

MSR

Military Specifications Reform

NPRM

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

NTSB

National Transportation Safety Board

NTTAA

National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act

ODA

Organization Delegation Authorization

OMB

Office of Management and Budget

Part 23

14 CFR Part 23

Part 25

14 CFR Part 25

PMA

Parts Manufacturing Approval

SAE

Society of Aerospace Engineers

SFAR

Special Federal Airworthiness Regulation

S-LSA

Special-Light Sport Aircraft

SPE

Special Category Experimental (NTSB database variable name)

SPL

Special Category Limited (NTSB database variable name)

SPR

Special Category Restricted (NTSB database variable name)

SPS

Special Flight (NTSB database variable name)

SPSS

Statistical Product and Service Solutions previously Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences

SPV

Special Provisional

SSF

Soaring Safety Foundation

STA

Standard Category Aerobatic (NTSB database variable name)
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STC

Supplemental Type Certificates

STN

Standard Category Normal (NTSB database variable name)

STT

Special Transport (NTSB database variable name)

STU

Standard Category Utility (NTSB database variable name)

TSOA

Technical Standard Order Authorization

UNK

Unknown (NTSB database variable name)

USITC

United States International Trade Commission

VFR

Visual Flight Rules
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE
The literature review provides a summary of the aircraft certification rules, an
overview of the existing GA fleet, an overview of the past present and future of GA, and
a summary of the evolution of aircraft certification regulations and airworthiness
standards. The current problems with Part 23 certification rules were examined, as well
as the main causes of accidents in GA. The main causes of accidents in GA were utilized
in the study to compare the frequency of accidents and accident rates among the different
aircraft certification categories.
Aircraft certification regulations are intended to promote the airworthiness of
aircraft by requiring manufacturers, components manufacturers, and operators of aircraft
to comply with approved aircraft designs, maintenance requirements, and operational
limitations. An airworthiness certificate is required to allow an aircraft to be operated as
a civil aircraft in the U.S.. The main objective of aircraft certification and continued
airworthiness requirements is to increase the reliability of safety critical systems. The
current regulations are mature and have evolved throughout the years (CACSM, 1998).
In the U.S., piston airplanes account for 67% of the total civil aviation aircraft
population, followed by experimental airplanes at 11% (Figure 1). The number of piston
airplanes manufactured annually has been decreasing substantially over the years.
According to GAMA (2012), the U.S. produced 15,594 piston airplanes in 1947;
however, only 1,514 piston airplanes were produced in 2012. The reduction in the
number of aircraft produced represents a decline of over 90% (see Figure 2).

20

U.S. Civil Aviation Aircraft Population
6,528; 3%

7,850; 3%
Piston Airplanes
Turboprops

3,785; 2%
1,899; 1%

24,784;
11%

Business Jets
Rotorcraft

10,102; 4%

Gliders
11,484; 5%

155,419; 67%

Lighter than Air

9,369; 4%

Experimental
LSA
Commercial Airliners

Figure 1. U.S. civil aviation aircraft population. Adapted from General Aviation
Statistical Databook and Industry Outlook by GAMA, 2012 and Small Airplanes by
G. Bowles, 2012.
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Figure 2. U.S. Part 23 airplanes manufactured annually. Adapted from General Aviation
Statistical Databook and Industry Outlook by GAMA, 2012.

The decrease in piston airplane production in the U.S. from 1947 to 2012,
can be attributed to many factors such as: (a) the re-distribution of the market
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share with the introduction of turbo-prop and jet airplanes, (b) the evolution of the
product liability law, (c) natural disasters, (d) wars, (e) terrorist attacks, (f) economic
downturns, (g) increasing fuel prices, and (h) rising certification costs (FAA, 2009;
GAMA, 2012; Shetty & Hansman, 2012).
Part 23 certified entry-level two-seat and four-seat airplanes are essential in pilot
flight training. The price of new entry-level airplanes has increased at a much higher rate
than the standard inflation (see Figure 3).
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Figure 3. Four-seat entry-level airplane comparison.
Note: The airplane base retail prices in the chart are for the following airplanes in order
from left to right: Cessna 170 in 1948, Aeronca Sedan in 1948, Cessna 172 in 1956,
Maule M-4 in 1962, Mooney Master in 1963, Beech Musketter in 1963, Piper Cherokee
in 1964, Gruman Cheetah in 1972, Beech Sundowner in 1974, Grumman Tiger in 1975,
Socata Tampico in 1990, Cirrus SR-20 in 1999, Diamond Star in 2000, Cessna 172 in
2012, and Cessna 182 in 2012. Standard inflationary rates against $5475 in 1948 were
utilized. Adapted from presentation, Small Airplanes, by G. Bowles, 2010.

According to the FAA (2009): “[a] consequence of the difficult regulatory
environment has been the high cost of certification and a corresponding reduction of new
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entry-level products  within  part  23”  (FAA,  2009,  p. 15). A growing concern also exists
about the number of active pilots in the U.S.. In 2012, the U.S. had 188,001 private
pilots, which represented over 100,000 fewer private pilots than in 1992. In 1992, the
private pilot population was at 288,078 (GAMA, 2012). In 2012, the number of sport
pilots has increased 10.5% to 4,493 (see Figure 4), while the number of private pilots has
been decreasing at an average rate of 10,000 pilots per year (GAMA, 2012).
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Figure 4. U.S. pilot population. Adapted from General Aviation Statistical Databook
and Industry Outlook by GAMA, 2012.

Past, Present, and Future of GA
The GA industry crises. The GA industry has suffered two major crises. The
first was in the late 1980s and early 1990s; it began as a result of the evolution of product
liability law and had disastrous effects upon the GA manufacturing industry in the U.S.
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(Gesell & Dempsey, 2005). The second GA industry crisis has been the result of a
combination of an economic recession that began at the end of 2007 combined with
rising certification costs.
The 1960s and 1970s were marked by strong support from the U.S. government to
protect the rights of consumers (Gesell & Dempsey, 2005). As a result, businesses were
mandated to stand behind their products. The underlying product liability decisions were
based on the theory that those selling products are in a better position to absorb losses
than the consumer. Hence, the product liability law shifted the responsibility for liability
from individuals to corporations (Gesell & Dempsey, 2005). As a result, the cost of
product liability insurance increased by orders of magnitude. This change in the product
liability insurance has had a negative effect upon the GA manufacturing industry in the
U.S.. By the 1980s, the product liability laws made the industry the responsible party,
not the consumer (Gesell & Dempsey, 2005).
In 1978, U.S. GA manufacturers produced almost 18,000 GA aircraft for
domestic use and for export (Wooley & Peters, 2012). The U.S. was the world leader in
the production of GA aircraft but by 1993, production had dwindled to fewer than 1,000
aircraft. As a result, over 100,000 jobs were lost in GA manufacturing (Wooley &
Peters, 2012).
According to Gesell and Dempsey (2005), the cost of product liability insurance
for GA aircraft manufacturers in 1962 was $51 per aircraft spread over 6,778 aircraft
produced that year. In 1972, the cost of product liability insurance increased to $2,111
per aircraft spread over 9,774 aircraft produced that year. By 1985, the average cost of
product liability insurance averaged $70,000 per aircraft, allocated among approximately
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2,000 aircraft delivered that year. Between 1981 and 1985, the average cost of product
liability rose over 500%, and in some isolated cases this cost increased to as much as
3,000% (Gesell & Dempsey, 2005). The average cost of product liability insurance per
airplane was higher than the cost of most single-engine airplanes (Wooley & Peters,
2012). In May of 1986, Cessna announced that they would cease production of pistonpowered aircraft, including their training airplanes. Piper Aircraft, the other leading
producer of low-cost training aircraft, went into bankruptcy and completely stopped
production in 1991 (Hudson, 1998).
In order to revive an industry on the edge of extinction, Congress passed the
General Aviation Revitalization Act (GARA) of 1994 (General Aviation Revitalization
Act, 1994). The Act established an 18 year statute of repose for GA aircraft and aircraft
components beyond which the manufacturer will not be liable in lawsuits alleging
defective manufacture or design. The Act is limited to aircraft with a seating capacity of
20 passengers or less that are not engaged in scheduled operations carrying passengers.
Some exceptions include willful fraud, medical evacuation, or people injured on the
ground (Brady, 2000). This Act intended to provide relief; revive airplane
manufacturing, engineering, sales, marketing, repair, maintenance, and related industries.
This Act also intended to support the then dying GA industry (General Aviation
Revitalization Act, 1994).
After GARA, GA aviation activity slowly recovered until the 1990s, when the
Gulf War, natural disasters–such as hurricane Andrew, and an economic downturn
resulted in another decline in GA’s  operational  activity (Shetty & Hansman, 2012). GA’s
operational activity increased again for about five years in the early 2000s until an
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economic downturn compounded with the 9/11 terrorists attacks, rising fuel prices, and a
worldwide economic recession at the end of the decade. Concurrently, there has been a
decline in the pilot and aircraft population, an increase in the price of new aircraft, and an
older active aircraft population (Shetty & Hansman, 2012).
Since the 1980s, three related facts remain: (a) new GA aircraft certification costs
have increased, (b) the number of GA aircraft produced has decreased, and (c) no
considerable changes in operational safety or accident rates have occurred (Bowles,
2010). The economic recession that began in December 2007 in the U.S., has further
increased the GA industry’s  downturn (Shetty & Hansman, 2012).
Since the early 2000s, the number of active private pilots has also been declining
(GAMA, 2012). The average age of the GA fleet is 40 years. Retrofitting old airplanes
with new equipment often requires a lengthy and expensive re-certification process.
Revitalizing the entry-level airplane market could have a beneficial effect on attracting
new pilots, as well as on allowing the implementation of new technologies that could
enhance safety (FAA, 2009).
On May 7, 2013, a bipartisan group of U.S. House of Representative’s members
led by Congressman Mike Pompeo, introduced the Small Aircraft Revitalization Act of
2013. This bill aims to establish a deadline for the implementation of the Part 23 ARC
recommendations (Small Aircraft Revitalization Act, 2013). According to Pompeo
(2013):  “[t]his legislation will improve safety, decrease costs, and free private-sector
innovation to revitalize this important industry”  (p.  1).
Importance of GA to the U.S. economy. Civil aviation consists of non-military
aviation, both private and commercial. GA consists of non-scheduled civil aviation
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activity. Civil aviation has been essential to the U.S. economy, and it constitutes a very
important component of the U.S. transportation system. According to the FAA (2011a),
in 2009, civil aviation supported over 10 million jobs, contributed $1.3 trillion in total
economic activity, and accounted for 5.2% of total U.S. GDP.    GA’s  contribution  to  the  
U.S. economy, including GA operations, GA manufacturing, and GA visitor
expenditures, was 0.3% of the U.S. GDP (see Table 1). GA aircraft manufacturing
contributed to 0.1% of the U.S. GDP (FAA, 2011c).
Civil aviation consists of commercial aviation and GA. Between 2008 and 2009,
real primary output for civil aviation as a whole fell 9.4%. Commercial aviation primary
output dropped 8.6% during the same period, while the primary output in GA fell 21.9%.
Primary output is used to calculate the total economic impact of civil aviation. To isolate
changes in civil aviation spending from inflationary effects, the nominal primary output
measures are transformed into constant 2005 dollars (FAA, 2011c).
GA operations contributed $38.9 billion to the total output. In the U.S., GA has
access to more than 5,178 public-use airports and a significant number of private airports,
making GA one of the major national airport users (FAA, 2010b). During the years of
2008 and 2009, the U.S. and global economic recession had a detrimental effect on civil
aviation, resulting in a decrease in GA manufacturing of 22.1% and a decrease in the
number of GA jobs by 19.5% (FAA, 2011c).
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Table 1. Civil Aviation Contribution to U.S. GDP in 2009.
Impact Type

Value Added ($Billions)

Percent of GDP

Airline Operations

150.5

1.1

Airport Operations

44.6

0.3

Civilian Aircraft Manufacturing

39.6

0.3

Civilian Aircraft Parts

10.2

0.1

Civilian Other Equipment

36.9

0.3

Air Couriers

40.8

0.3

Visitor Expenditures

359.3

2.5

Travel Arrangements

7.5

0.1

689.3

4.9

GA Operations

19.7

0.1

GA Manufacturing

12.1

0.1

7.1

0.1

Sub-total GA

38.9

0.3

Total Impact

728.2

5.2

Sub-total Commercial

GA Visitor Expenditures

Note. Adapted from FAA (2011a).

Overall, GA flight hours dropped nearly 25% between 2000 and 2009. “Most of
the decrease in GA flight hours is due in part to the dramatic drop in flight hours by
piston engine airplanes”  (FAA,  2011a,  p.30). Piston-engine airplane flight hours dropped
nearly 39% between 2000 and 2009, while turboprop, jet, and rotorcraft GA airplanes
increased by 9%, 14.7%, and 30.1%, respectively, during the same period (FAA, 2011c).

28
Light Sport Aircraft category. In March, 1996, President Clinton signed Public
Law 104-113, also known as the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of
1995 (NTTAA, 1996). The primary purpose of the NTTAA is to ensure that government
agencies attain greater reliance on voluntary consensus standards developed by the
private sector and decrease the dependence on government-unique standards that were
developed by and for the government (NTTAA, 1996). GA advocacy groups that were
concerned about the rising certification costs and dwindling pilot populations petitioned
the FAA to apply NTTAA to an aviation case.
In 2004, the FAA initiated a test case with the certification of the new LSA
aircraft utilizing consensus standards (Bowles, 2010). ASTM was chosen for the
implementation and management of LSA consensus standards. Founded in 1898, ASTM
has been recognized internationally as a leader in the development and delivery of
international voluntary consensus standards. These standards are not limited to aviation
fuel standards; the standards also include normal and utility aircraft electrical wiring
systems, metallurgy, and many others (ASTM, 2012). Early indicators show that the
LSA category has been a success; thus, the propagation of consensus standards to more
mainstream uses has become an appealing option applicable to other segments of aviation
(FAA, 2009).
Part 23 Certification Process Study (CPS). Historically, the FAA has hosted
regulatory reviews for Part 23 approximately every ten years. However, the two most
recent reviews of Part 23 were performed in 1974 and in 1984 (FAA, 2009). In 2009, the
FAA began a Part 23 CPS to assess the adequacy of the current airworthiness standards.
In August 2011, following the recommendations of the CPS, the FAA created a Part 23
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ARC. The CPS report included recommendations in five main areas: (a) performance
based standards for Part 23 certification, (b) design certification, (c) continued
airworthiness, (d) data management, and (e) pilot interface (FAA, 2009).
The CPS recommended the reorganization of Part 23 and the creation of tiers
based on airplane performance and complexity as opposed to the existing weight and
propulsion classifications. It was also recommended that certification requirements for
Part 23 airplanes be written on a broad general and progressive level of tiers based on
complexity and with a level of regulatory oversight that is consistent with this
classification (FAA, 2009).
The design certification recommendations from the CPS addressed modifications
affecting the existing type certification of airplanes in order to keep older airplanes
operating safely; these design modifications also include upgrading airplanes with better
systems and/or new technologies, such as avionics, autopilots, ballistic parachutes, and
inflatable restraints. These recommendations also addressed the maintenance of new
parts or technologies that the original airplane manufacturer never envisioned being
installed on their airplane (FAA, 2009, p. 30).
The CPS also provided continued airworthiness recommendations that addressed
the need to make safety related modifications more affordable and feasible, along with
removing delays associated with the approval of modifications and alterations of certified
airplanes. The CPS also recommended the creation of policy to allow the use of accepted
industry or government standards for the alteration or modification of a product, if the
new standard exceeds the original standard created under the airplane’s  airworthiness  
certification (FAA, 2009, p. 42).
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Part 23 Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC). In August 2011, following
the recommendations of the CPS, the FAA created a Part 23 Aviation Rulemaking
Committee (ARC) (FAA, 2011b). Tasking for the ARC included a re-write of the
regulations on a broad, general, and progressive level and creating tiers based on airplane
performance and complexity, as opposed to the existing weight and propulsion
classifications. In accordance with the recommendations from the CPS, the ARC was
also tasked with modifying the required oversight for Part 23 products to be consistent
with aircraft complexity (FAA, 2009, p. 15).
The Part 23 ARC consisted of approximately 55 members including
representatives from the FAA, European Aviation Safety Agency, National Civil
Aviation Agency of Brazil, Civil Aviation Administration of China, Transport Canada,
Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand, airplane manufacturers, avionics
manufacturers, and industry groups. The committee concluded their meetings in January
2013, and they submitted their recommendations to the FAA in May, 2013 (Pompeo,
2013).
The main objectives of the ARC were to: (a) develop a performance-based
approach to airworthiness standards for Part 23 airplanes, (b) set an international standard
that advances the introduction of new technologies, (c) reduce fatal accidents by 50%,
and (d) reduce certification costs also by 50% (FAA, 2011c).
International standards that promote the introduction of new products are
necessary in order to leverage the rapidly evolving technological advances. A GA
chapter has been created within ASTM (ASTM F44) to facilitate the adoption of
international standards that will advance the introduction of new technologies (Clauson,
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2012). The FAA utilizes similar industry standards through policy and guidance
documents. Many of the Part 25 avionics and systems are approved using industry and
government standards. By taking some of the guidance out of the regulations and by
setting high-level requirements that are implemented through industry and government
standards, the FAA would have total control over the design requirements while
maintaining flexibility and adaptability to address new product developments.
Maximizing the use of acceptable industry standards also conforms with NTTAA and
requires government agencies to make use of public standards wherever possible (FAA,
2009).
Problems and limitations of the current Part 23 certification process. Part 23
rules have evolved from the design standards created back in the 1920s. As time
progressed and as scientific knowledge was gained through continued investigation,
experimentation, and accrued service histories, the certification regulations evolved into
increasingly comprehensive rules to address safety issues, engineering advancements,
airworthiness requirements, and the incorporation of new technologies. While it is
possible to modify existing aircraft using their original certification basis, the current
rules do not address the installation or maintenance of new equipment that the original
manufacturer never envisioned being installed on the airplane. Consequently, the
incorporation of new technologies into old aircraft that could potentially enhance safety
has become very difficult and time consuming, as these changes would frequently require
a rule change or a change in certification (Part 23 ARC, 2012).
The current regulations are very prescriptive in nature and do not allow
manufacturers to utilize alternative means of compliance or find more economical paths
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to provide the acceptable levels of safety. An AC is relied upon to provide interpretations
of the regulations as well as a means of compliance. In practice, following the guidance
presented in ACs has been the easiest path to obtaining certification approval, or in some
cases, this guidance has been treated as the only acceptable mode of compliance, which
again precludes manufacturers from proposing a simplified method of compliance
intended to show equivalent safety more economically (Part 23 ARC, 2012). In addition,
the interpretation of the ACs and regulations could vary among Aircraft Certification
Offices and Manufacturing Inspection District Offices. Both the safety regulations within
Part 23 and the ACs have historically been infrequently revised; therefore, advances in
technology have outpaced the rate at which the guidance and the regulations within Part
23 have been updated (Part 23 ARC, 2012).
Most of the currently active aircraft in the lower tier of Part 23 were certified
based on CAR 3 certification and would not be able to be certified under the current
Part 23 rules without significant additional effort; yet, these aircraft have proven to
provide an acceptable level of safety to continue operating over the last 50 to 60 years
(Part 23 ARC, 2012). Some of the older aircraft designs have been updated to meet
Part 23 rules such as the newer Cessna 172 models that are still in production. However,
“A  consequence  of  the  difficult  regulatory  environment  has  been  the  high  cost  of  
certification and a corresponding reduction of new entry-level products  within  part  23”  
(FAA, 2009, p. 15). Therefore, as of 2012, the average age of a four-seat airplane has
increased to 42 years (GAMA, 2012). Manufacturers and aircraft owners have found it
difficult to introduce new safety enhancing technologies into older aircraft (Part 23 ARC,
2012).
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Part 23 relies on a system of overlapping ACs and, to a lesser extent, industry
standards to establish safety requirements. A large portion of these safety regulations
prescribe design  solutions.    This  prescriptive  approach  has  limited  the  manufacturers’  
ability to implement new safety-enhancing and cost-reducing technologies due to the
difficulty defining an acceptable means of compliance within the existing rules and
guidance. In order to improve the efficiency of the certification process, decrease the
cost of certification, and allow for technological advances, the members of the Part 23
Certification ARC have suggested the implementation of industry standards to separate
the intent of the rule from the technical implementation requirements and means of
compliance. The intent of the rule would remain regulatory in the FARs, and the
technical implementation requirements and means of compliance will be captured in
industry standards and guidance documents (Part 23 ARC, 2012).
Experimental-Amateur Built airplane category growth and accident rate. In
2013, E-AB airplanes represent the fastest growing type of aircraft in the GA fleet (FAA,
2013a). In 2011, there were approximately 33,000 registered E-AB aircraft, a 10%
increase from 2008. From 2009 through 2011, E-AB aircraft accounted for 14% of
airplanes in nonfatal GA accidents and approximately 21% of airplanes in fatal accidents.
In 2009, accident data indicated that experimental airplanes were involved in
approximately 27% of fatal accidents in the U.S., yet only accounted for 3.4% of the total
GA fleet hours (FAA, 2011a).
In 2012, the NTSB completed a safety study of E-AB aircraft. Among other
findings, the NTSB concluded that the first 50 hours of flight, known as the flight test
period for E-AB airplanes, are uniquely challenging for most pilots. During the first
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50 hours of flight, the pilot must learn to manage the handling characteristics of an
unfamiliar airplane as well as the challenges of the flight test environment, in many cases
without having received any previous formal flight test training. Some of the most
common difficulties encountered during flight testing include: instrumentation that is not
yet calibrated, controls that may need adjustments, possible malfunctions, or adverse
handling characteristics (NTSB, 2012b).
According to the NTSB study, power-plant failures and loss of control in flight
are the most common E-AB aircraft accident occurrences, and structural failures have not
been a common occurrence among E-AB aircraft. In comparison with similar non E-AB
aircraft, a much higher proportion of accidents involving E AB aircraft occur early in the
operational life of the aircraft or shortly after being purchased by a subsequent owner.
The study also indicates that the majority of E-AB aircraft are now built from commercial
kits, rather than from purchased plans or original designs (NTSB, 2012b). The study also
indicated that pilots of E-AB aircraft, have similar, or higher, levels of total aviation
experience than pilots of non-E-AB aircraft engaged in similar GA operations; however,
pilots of E-AB accident aircraft, on average, had considerably less flight experience in
the type of E-AB aircraft. E-AB aircraft are not allowed to be operated for compensation
or hire, which includes flight instruction; therefore, finding suitable E-AB aircraft and
instructors available for training is difficult and presents a barrier to pilots seeking
transition training (NTSB, 2012b).
The NTSB study also concluded that E-AB aircraft safety is largely managed by
the community of E-AB aircraft builders, owners, and kit manufacturers rather than by
FAA regulatory requirements; however, the FAA regulations mostly seek to ensure that
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the majority work within the E-AB aircraft building process is done by the builder
(NTSB, 2012b). Airworthiness certificates are granted to the E-AB aircraft builder by
the FAA based only on a review of documentation and a one-time inspection of the
aircraft  after  it  has  been  completed.    Unlike  other  foreign  civil  aviation  authorities’  
requirements, the FAA has no requirement for pre-approval of the project or in-process
inspections of materials and workmanship. According to the NTSB (2012b), a large
proportion of E-AB aircraft accidents involving loss of engine power could be reduced by
requiring documentation of a functional test of the aircraft fuel system as part of the
initial airworthiness certification.
E-AB can be built from plans or unique designs, or they can also be built from
commercially available kits of various levels of completion. The FAA regulations
however, require that the builder perform a minimum of 51% of the construction of an
E-AB aircraft to qualify for a special airworthiness certificate (FAA, 2011a). Every
E-AB aircraft is different from one another, even aircraft completed from commercially
available kits. Since E-AB aircraft are unique; every early flight in the flight test phase
constitutes an experiment (NTSB, 2012b). On the other hand, in certified production
airplanes, new models are usually evolutions of previous designs utilizing proven
technologies (McClellan, 2013). The flight test program for certified production
airplanes is very structured with the support of very experienced flight test pilots, staff
engineers, and flight test engineers who create a flight test program designed to minimize
risks. Certified airplanes have a pilot operating handbook that provides details about the
aircraft’s  performance;;  systems;;  normal  and  emergency  operating  procedures;;  weight  and  
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balance; and any other information pertinent to the pilot. On the contrary, E-AB aircraft
have no pilot operating handbook (FAA, 2011a).
FAR 91.319 (a)(2) prohibits the use of E-AB airplanes for hire, including flight
instruction and rental; therefore, receiving flight instruction in experimental aircraft is
not always feasible (McClellan, 2013). Alternatively, qualified Certified Flight
Instructors (CFIs) with experience in certified airplanes are widely available. One of the
main advantages for people to acquire an E-AB, or convert a certified aircraft to the
experimental category, is that one can make modifications to an aircraft without any
coordination with the manufacturer (McClellan, 2013).
Main causes of GA accidents. According to the NTSB (2012a), in 2010, GA
accidents accounted for 96% of all aviation accidents, 97% of fatal aviation accidents,
and 96% of all fatalities for U.S. civil aviation. In addition, GA accounted for 51% of the
estimated total flight time of all U.S. civil aviation in 2010. Figure 5 shows the total and
fatal accidents for GA for the years from 2001 to 2010, including the experimental
category. These accidents do not include commercial aviation operations including
Parts 121, 135, or 129 operations. These figures also do not include air medical,
sightseeing, or air tour operations, since these types of accidents were discussed
separately in the NTSB report (2012a).
The NTSB (2012a) report indicates that the number of GA accidents declined
over the period of 2001 and 2010; however, the number of fatal accidents has remained
steady over the same period of time. Fatal accidents account for approximately 19% of
total accidents in GA; this percentage has also remained relatively steady, ranging from
17% to 20% between 2001 to 2010 (see Figure 5). The accident rate for both fatal and
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non-fatal accidents also remained relatively steady, as the number of hours flown have
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Figure 5. Total and fatal GA accidents. Adapted from Review of Aircraft Accident Data
2010 by NTSB, 2012, p. 33.

decreased during the same period of time. Figure 6 shows the estimated total flight hours
for GA based on the GA Survey, and Figure 7 shows the accident rate for GA. One of
the major limitations with GA activity data is that the number of hours flown per year and
other activity information is obtained from the GA survey. The GA survey collects
voluntary  information  from  aircraft  owners  and  operators.    “The Federal Aviation
Administration’s (FAA) survey of general aviation operators, on which the agency bases
its annual flight-hour estimates, continues to suffer from methodological and conceptual
limitations,  even  with  FAA’s  efforts  to  improve  it  over  the  years”  (GAO,  2012). In order
to maintain a more accurate count of the number of active aircraft, the FAA began
requiring owners and operators of aircraft to renew aircraft registrations every three
years, beginning in 2010.
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Figure 6. Estimated GA flight hours. Adapted from Review of Aircraft Accident Data
2010 by NTSB, 2012a, p. 35.

Figure 7. Total  and  fatal  accident  rates  for  GA.  Adapted  from  “Review of aircraft
accident  data  2010”  by  NTSB,  2012a, p. 36.
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GA encompasses a wide range of operations and aircraft, from powered
parachutes, gliders, and light sport aircraft, to turboprops and jets used for a variety of
missions. The majority of GA accidents in 2010 involved personal flying in fixed-wing
airplanes, which accounted for 64% (912) of the total number of accidents; the second
category of GA accidents was flight instruction in fixed-wing airplanes, which accounted
for 10% (140) of the accidents (NTSB, 2012a). Personal flying encompasses a wide
variety of activities, from local currency flights to long distance cross countries.
According to the NTSB (2012a), 78% of personal flying was conducted in fixed-wing,
single-engine, piston airplanes. In addition, the number of personal flying hours greatly
decreased between 2003 and 2010 (see Figure 8), which coincides with the decrease in
GA hours that were shown in Figure 6.

Figure 8. Estimated flight hours for personal flying. Adapted from Review of Aircraft
Accident Data 2010 by NTSB, 2012a, p. 41.
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In Stephens (2012), the FAA identified the top ten leading causes of fatal GA
accidents to be (see Figure 9):
1. loss of control in flight,
2. controlled flight into terrain,
3. system or component failure/power plant,
4. low altitude operations,
5. unknown or undetermined,
6. other,
7. fuel related,
8. system component failure – non-powerplant,
9. midair collisions, and
10. wind shear or thunderstorm.

Figure 9. Top ten causes of GA fatal accidents. Adapted from Status of the GAJSC and
development of the forensic data analysis process, by C. Stephens, 2012.
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According to the FAA (2011a), from 2010 to 2012, fatal accidents from CFIT
have been reduced by more than 50% compared to the previous three years. Fatal
accidents involving LOC in flight, during approach, and during landing have decreased
20 to 25%. Meanwhile, fatal accidents caused by bad weather have decreased by nearly
40% in the past three years, and fatal accidents occurring at night decreased by about
25%. The FAA attributes these reductions in fatal accidents to the use of technology
such as Global Positioning System (GPS) with moving maps and in-flight weather
capabilities. New technologies such as inflatable restraints, ballistic parachutes, data-link
weather in the cockpit, Angle of Attack (AOA) indicators, traffic alert systems, and
terrain avoidance equipment could continue reducing GA fatalities if these technologies
are allowed to be implemented in certified airplanes. The FAA is making an effort to
facilitate the approval process of AOA indicators and seatbelts with airbags in order to
allow all GA aircraft to be eligible for the installation of these devices (FAA, 2011a).
In a further effort to reduce GA accidents, the GAJSC was formed in the mid1990s and is currently renewing its accident reduction efforts. The GAJSC is a
government and industry group that uses a data-driven, consensus-based approach to
analyze safety data to develop specific interventions that will mitigate the root causes of
accidents. The group released recommendations to address LOC during approach and
landing (GAJSC, 2012). The report addresses the current Part 23 certification problems
and emphasizes the importance of incorporating new technologies to prevent accidents.
CFIT fatal accidents dropped 60% between 2001 and 2010; the GAJSC (2012) attributes
that improvement to the use of electronic information such as GPS position on a moving
map, real time weather, terrain awareness, and traffic awareness. These electronic
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devices have made a considerable contribution in the reduction of pilot workload. The
GAJSC (2012) also emphasizes that most of the safety enhancing technology that
lowered the CFIT accident rate was in the form of handheld equipment not installed in
the airplane, such as handheld GPSs and tablets.
The GAJSC (2012) also recommended the use of AOA indicators and autopilots
to prevent LOC accidents; however, these technologies, for the most part, must be
installed in the airplane and are not available in the form of handheld equipment. The
high cost of certification and installation keeps these technologies out of small certified
airplanes. The report also states that the cost of installing an existing AOA system on a
certified airplane is almost 10 times higher than installing the same system on an
experimental airplane.
According to the GAJSC (2012), LOC accidents at night and in Instrument
Meteorological Conditions (IMC) would drop by 50% simply by installing autopilots in
the more than 100,000 Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) capable GA airplanes. Autopilots
can be installed in experimental airplanes for as low as $2,500; however, installing an
autopilot on a certified airplane could cost at least $10,000, which represents between 10
to 50% of the average value of a GA airplane. The GAJSC (2012) report also
recommended that the FAA apply a risk management approach to analyze whether the
current certification regulations are actually an obstacle to installing safety enhancing
technology into the GA fleet.
The Evolution of Airworthiness Certification Standards
Airworthiness standards and the processes utilized to implement these standards
are mandated by the federal government; these standards have evolved over the years
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through legislative and regulatory changes. These changes have been driven mainly by
four areas: (a) public and congressional concern about air transportation safety,
(b) introductions of new technologies, (c) lessons learned from accidents or incidents, and
(d) he need for harmonization with international air transportation policies and
regulations (CACSM, 1998).
Airworthiness standards state that no person may lawfully operate a civil aircraft
in the U.S. unless the aircraft has an airworthiness certificate. The requirements for the
certification of civil aircraft date back to the Air Commerce Act of 1926 (Komons, 1978).
These regulations were codified in the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Air
Commerce Aeronautics Bulletin No. 7 titled: Airworthiness Requirements for Aircraft by
the Department of Commerce Bureau of Air Commerce (1926). On March 29, 1927, the
Department of Commerce Aeronautics Branch issued the first aircraft type certificate to
the Buhl Airster CA-3. In the late 1930s, the Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA) was
established and a replacement for Bulletin No. 7 was issued. The new regulation was the
Civil Air Regulation (CAR) Part-4. This regulation recognized the need for separate
regulations for small aircraft and larger transport aircraft. CAR Part 4 covered small
aircraft, while CAR Part 4T covered transport aircraft. Helicopters were later added to
the certification regulations (Kimberlin, 2003).
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 resulted in the issuance of new regulations:
CAR 4A for small aircraft and CAR 4B for transport aircraft. These designations were
later changed to CAR Part 3 for small aircraft, defined as aircraft with a maximum
certificated takeoff weight of 12,500 pounds or less, and CAR Part 4b for transport
aircraft, defined as those aircraft with maximum certificated takeoff weight in excess of
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12,500 pounds (Kimberlin, 2003). Figure 10 illustrates the evolution of airworthiness
regulations.

12,500

12,500

Figure 10. History and Evolution of Airworthiness Regulations. Adapted from: Flight
Testing of Fixed-Wing Aircraft, by R. D. Kimberlin, 2003, p. 8, American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics.

The FAA believes that the creators of CAR 3 selected 13,000 pounds as the
weight division between what they considered the largest small airplane and the smallest
large airplane (FAA, 2009). Since 13,000 pounds was considered a number of bad luck,
the creators of CAR 3 chose 12,500 instead. The DC-3 was one of the large airplanes at
the time, with a seating capacity of up to 13 passengers and a maximum certificated
takeoff weight of 25,000 pounds; around the same time, the largest light twin-engine
airplane was the Beech 18, which had a maximum certificated takeoff weight of about
8,000 pounds. Historically, smaller, lighter airplanes were typically simpler and slower,
while larger and heavier airplanes were more complex and faster. While splitting aircraft
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categories based on weight had a logical foundation, one of the problems of aircraft
certification is the wide spectrum of complexity of Part 23 airplanes: (a) ranging from
slow single-engine airplanes to very fast jets, and (b) all with maximum certificated gross
weights of 12,500 pounds or less (Bowles, 2010).
Many of today's light aircraft and some transport aircraft are still certified using
the CARs as their type certification regulatory basis if the manufacturer applied for the
original type of certificate when these regulations were in effect (Kimberlin, 2003). In
1965, after the Civil Aeronautics Authority became the Federal Aviation Agency, new
aircraft certification regulations were issued. Aircraft with maximum certificated takeoff
weights of 12,500 pounds and below were governed by 14 CFR Part 23, while aircraft
with maximum certificated takeoff weights in excess of 12,500 pounds were governed
by 14 CFR Part 25 (Part 25). Initially, these rules were very similar to the CAR 3 rules;
however, changes in technology and accidents have caused the rules to be revised and
changed considerably.
In the 1960s, the development of the jet engine allowed civilian jets to be
produced. The early civilian jets had a maximum certificated takeoff weight of over
12,500 pounds, so they naturally fell within the CAR 4 or Part 25 transport category. Bill
Lear created the Learjet 23 and intentionally set the maximum certificated takeoff weight
at  exactly  12,500  pounds  so  as  to  remain  in  the  Part  23  category.    Lear’s  intent  was  to  
simplify certification and save time. Lear wanted the Learjet to be one of the first
business jet in history and also wanted to complete the aircraft certification process
before that of one of its competitors, the Jet Commander (Slocum, 1978). The Lear 23
was allowed to be certified under Part 23 with the exception that it was required to have a
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crew of two pilots, a requirement that previously applied only to Part 25 airplanes. The
next Learjet model built was the Lear 24, which was almost identical to the Lear 23, but
it was certified under Part 25 (Slocum, 1978). In more modern times the Cessna Citation,
which weighed much less than 12,500 pounds, because it was a jet, was certified under
Part 25 and was required to have two pilots. A few years later, Cessna built the Model
501 Citation I-SP that was certified for single-pilot operations under Part 23; this airplane
was almost identical to the Citation 500 (Slocum, 1978).
In the 1970s, the 19 passenger turboprops, such as the Beech 1900 and the Merlin
Metro, emerged on the market and started being used for airline feeder routes. The FAA
decided to use Part 23 certification standards for this new commuter class, supplementing
many sections with Part 25 Special Federal Airworthiness Regulation (SFAR)
requirements (FAA, 2009).
Initially, the commuter class within Part 23 was reserved for airplanes already
certified and in production; however, new business jets, like the Beech Premier and
Citation CJ2 emerged. These jets were built with maximum certificated takeoff weights
of less than 12,500 pounds in order to remain under Part 23. To certify other highperformance jets such as the Citation CJ4 or the Embraer Phenom 300 under Part 23, the
FAA created a new set of SFAR documents with the special conditions the airplanes had
to meet. These jets were required to meet the same engine failure minimum climb takeoff profile of the large jets, which is imposed as a special condition on those airplanes
and did not extend to all airplanes in Part 23. In 2006, the FAA certified the Eclipse 500
very light jet. Since the Eclipse 500 weighed less than 6,000 pounds, it was exempt from
meeting the engine failure minimum climb performance. The FAA allowed this
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exception since propeller airplanes that weigh less than 6,000 pounds do not have engineout climb requirements (Eclipse Aviation Corporation [EAC], 2008).
The special conditions necessary to fit high-performance jets into certification
standards originally designed for piston single-engine and twin-engine airplanes resulted
in rule changes catered to the certification of higher performance and more complex
aircraft. Between 1994 and 1996, approximately 800 rule changes to Part 23 were
enacted. The rule changes ranged from corrections, to harmonization with European
rules, to rules that addressed new technologies. While these changes addressed the needs
of more sophisticated Part 23 airplanes, the overall certification complexity increased,
making it more costly to certify less complex aircraft (FAA, 2009).
The Aircraft Certification Process
The Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) contain the airworthiness standards and
are contained separately in Chapter I of Title 14 of the CFR. The FARs provide the type
certification requirements or airworthiness standards. These airworthiness standards
include requirements for aircraft design, manufacturers’  production  quality  control  
systems, operations standards, and maintenance standards for air carriers and repair
facilities (CACSM, 1998).
The main goals of aircraft certification and continued airworthiness standards are:
(a) to increase the reliability of safety-critical systems, and (b) to ensure that the
probability of the failure for a particular safety-critical system is less than one in one
billion for each flight hour. The FAA has sought to achieve these goals through
regulations that contains standards for design, analysis, tests, inspection, maintenance,
and operations (CACSM, 1998).
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The Aircraft Certification Service (AIR) is the department within the FAA that
develops and administers safety standards for aircraft and related products manufactured
in the U.S., or utilized by operators of U.S. registered aircraft. The FARs administered
by the AIR can be seen in Table 2.

Table 2. FARs Administered by the AIR.
FAR

Description

FAR Part 21

Certification procedures for products and parts

FAR Part 23

Airworthiness standards for normal, utility, aerobatic, and
commuter category aircraft.

FAR Part 25

Airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes

FAR Part 27

Airworthiness standards for normal category rotorcraft

FAR Part 29

Airworthiness standards for transport category rotorcraft

FAR Part 33

Airworthiness standards for aircraft engines

FAR Part 35

Airworthiness standards for propellers

FAR Part 39

Airworthiness directives

Aircraft certification regulations, Parts 21-39, are intended to ensure the
airworthiness of aircraft by requiring the manufacturers of aircraft, engines, propellers,
and any other component to comply with approved type designs. Aircraft certification
regulations also require the development of operations limitations and maintenance
requirements (CACSM, 1998). The AIR consists of six policy centers located at the FAA
headquarters in Washington, DC and four directorates: (a) the Transport Airplane
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Directorate in Seattle, Washington; (b) the Small Airplane Directorate in Kansas City,
Missouri; (c) the Rotorcraft Directorate in Forth Worth, Texas; and (d) the Engine and
Propeller Directorate in Burlington, Massachusetts.
Each directorate is also assigned a geographic area that covers about one-fourth of
the U.S. and designated areas overseas. Within its assigned areas, each directorate is
responsible for all the administrative aspects of aircraft certifications and continued
airworthiness. An infrastructure of Aircraft Certification Offices (ACOs) and
Manufacturing  Inspection  District  Offices  (MIDOs)  are  assigned  to  each  directorate’s  
geographic area (CACSM, 1998). The ACOs approve the design for all types of new
aircraft, engines, and propellers; aircraft and system modifications; new materials; and
spare parts. MIDOs approve production certificates for manufacturers of all types of
regulated products and oversee the production quality control systems (CACSM, 1998).
Both the ACOs and the MIDOs have continued operational safety functions that involve
participation in aircraft accidents and incidents, reviewing service difficulty reports,
developing ADs, and enforcing regulations.
Airworthiness certificates. Airworthiness certificates are the cornerstones of
AIR’s  overall  certification  process  (CACSM, 1998). In order to receive an airworthiness
certificate, the aircraft must conform to its FAA approved type design and be in safe
operating condition. The FAA issues standard and special airworthiness certificates.
Special airworthiness certificates do not meet these international certification standards
set by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Special airworthiness
certificates include the following categories: primary, restricted, limited, provisional,
light-sport, experimental, and special flight permits (FAA, 2010a).
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Type certificates. The FAA grants approval of every new and modified design
of aircraft, aircraft engines, and propellers through a type certificate. The type
certification process includes design approvals for materials, spare parts, and any other
parts or equipment installed on a type-certificated aircrafts, engines, and propellers
(CACSM, 1998). The FAA grants approval of initial type designs of new products such
as aircraft, engines, and propellers after the type of certification basis under 14 CFR
21.17 has been established. “The  certification basis identifies the applicable standards to
which  the  Applicant  must  show  compliance”  (AIA,  GAMA & FAA, 2004, p. A2-40 ).
The type certification basis includes applicable airworthiness standards in effect and may
include special conditions. These special conditions will have been developed to address
novel and unusual design features of the product that are not specifically covered in the
basic airworthiness standards.
The type certification basis may be amended throughout the certification process;
however, once the type certificate is issued, the type certificate basis becomes part of the
type certificate and cannot be changed. However, manufacturers may make design
changes throughout the life of a particular product. These changes are classified as either
major or minor changes. The FAA issues a Supplemental Type Certificates (STC) when
an entity other than the manufacturer or holder of the type certificate has been approved
to make a major change to a product in order to improve reliability, performance, or
safety. Other approval documents used for type certification include Technical Standard
Order Authorizations (TSOAs) for the design of equipment, parts, materials, and Parts
Manufacturing Approvals (PMAs) for the design of spare and replacement parts not
included in the type certificate (CACSM, 1998).
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Production certificates. The FAA issues four different types of production
approvals: production certificates, production inspection system letters, PMAs, and
TSOAs. Production certificates are issued for products that have already received a type
certificate. Production inspection system letters are similar to production certificates with
the exception that they are issued to small manufacturers of aircraft, engines, and
propellers (CACSM, 1998). Each holder of a production approval is responsible for
incorporating quality control systems and ensuring that all of the suppliers operate in
accordance with the FAA approved production quality control system (CACSM, 1998).
Continued airworthiness. The FAA continuously monitors the safety
performance of aircraft in service. Airworthiness Directives (ADs) are issued by the
FAA to prevent unsafe conditions that could arise while an aircraft is in service.
Feedback from manufacturers, operators, pilots, mechanics, and from aircraft
investigators, as well as recommendations from the NTSB are taken into account to
determine when corrective actions are necessary (CACSM, 1998). In some cases, public
confidence, often manifested by political pressures, can become a factor in the decision
making process. As a result, ADs have been issued to restore public confidence even
before a technical investigation has been concluded (CACSM, 1998).
FAA delegation. Historically, the FAA has relied on organizational and
individual designee programs to meet its safety responsibilities and to provide timely
services by leveraging limited resources (Aircraft Certification Process Review and
Reform/Aviation Rulemaking Committee [ACPRR/ARC], 2012). One type of individual
designee is the Designated Engineering Representative (DER); DERs are non-FAA
employees authorized to approve information related to aircraft structures, engines,
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propellers, flight characteristics, systems, and equipment on behalf of the FAA. Since
1956, the FAA has developed various forms of organizational delegation. In 2005, the
FAA created the Organization Delegation Authorization (ODA) program. The main
purpose of the ODA program was to consolidate all the organizational delegations under
the ODA umbrella and to standardize oversight (Department of Transportation [DOT],
2011).
Rulemaking process. All regulations issued by a federal agency, including the
FAA, must be disseminated through a public rulemaking process in accordance with the
Administrative Procedure Act. Rulemaking proposals may be triggered internally or
externally. External proposals may come from public petitions, NTSB recommendations,
executive orders, or congressional statutes. Internal proposals may arise from the Office
of the Secretary of Transportation, the FAA Administrator, the Office of the Chief
Counsel, or individual FAA offices such as AIR (CACSM, 1998). After the need for a
regulatory change is identified, a proposed rule change is developed and published in the
form of a NPRM. A comment period is then made available and public comments in
response to the NPRM are evaluated; the final rule is then written, approved, published,
and implemented.
The NTTAA and the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-119
The primary purpose of the NTTAA is to ensure that government agencies attain
greater reliance on voluntary consensus standards developed by the private sector and to
decrease the dependence on government-unique standards developed by, and for, the
government (National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act, 1996). The U.S.
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued the OMB Circular A-119 to establish
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and disseminate policies (a) on Federal use and development of voluntary consensus
standards, and (b) on conformity assessment activities consistent with NTTAA (Office of
Budget and Management [OMB], 1998).
Definition of standards. OMB Circular A-119 defines the term standard as
follows:
a. The term "standard", or "technical standard" as cited in the Act
[NTTAA], includes all of the following
(1) Common and repeated use of rules, conditions, guidelines or
characteristics for products or related processes and production
methods, and related management systems practices.
(2) The definition of terms; classification of components;
delineation of procedures; specification of dimensions, materials,
performance, designs, or operations; measurement of quality and
quantity in describing materials, processes, products, systems,
services, or practices; test methods and sampling procedures; or
descriptions of fit and measurements of size or strength.
b. The term "standard" does not include the following:
(1) Professional standards of personal conduct.
(2) Institutional codes of ethics. (OMB, 1998, para. 3)
Industry consensus standards. According to the OMB Circular A-119 with
regard to NTTAA, voluntary consensus standards are:
For purposes of this policy, "voluntary consensus standards" are standards
developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, both domestic and
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international. These standards include provisions requiring that owners of relevant
intellectual property have agreed to make that intellectual property available on a
non-discriminatory, royalty-free or reasonable royalty basis to all interested
parties. For purposes of this Circular, "technical standards that are developed or
adopted by voluntary consensus standard bodies" is an equivalent term.
(1) "Voluntary consensus standards bodies" are domestic or international
organizations which plan, develop, establish, or coordinate voluntary
consensus standards using agreed-upon procedures. For purposes of this
Circular, "voluntary, private sector, consensus standards bodies," as cited
in Act, is an equivalent term. The Act and the Circular encourage the
participation of federal representatives in these bodies to increase the
likelihood that the standards they develop will meet both public and
private sector needs. A voluntary consensus standards body is defined by
the following attributes:
(i) Openness.
(ii) Balance of interest.
(iii) Due process.
(iv) An appeals process.
(v) Consensus, which is defined as general agreement, but not
necessarily unanimity, and includes a process for attempting to
resolve objections by interested parties, as long as all comments
have been fairly considered, each objector is advised of the
disposition of his or her objection(s) and the reasons why, and the
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consensus body members are given an opportunity to change their
votes after reviewing the comments (OMB, 1998, para. 4).
Consensus standards organizations. Voluntary consensus standards bodies are
domestic or international organizations that plan, develop, establish, or coordinate
voluntary consensus standards using agreed-upon procedures (OMB, 1998). Hundreds of
these organizations are involved in the development of the standards utilized in the
aerospace industry. The main organizations involved in the development of aviation
standards include: ASTM, Society of Aerospace Engineers (SAE), American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA), American Society for Mechanical Engineers
(ASME), Department of Defense (DoD), Electronic Industries Alliance/Government
Electronics and Information Technology Association (EIA/GEIA), Institute of Electrical
and Electronic Engineers (IEEE), Institute for Printed Circuits (IPC), International
Organization for Standardization (ISO), and AIA (AIA, 2005).
Founded in 1898, ASTM has been recognized internationally as a leader in the
development and delivery of international voluntary consensus standards. These
standards include and are not limited to aviation fuel standards, normal and utility aircraft
electrical wiring systems, metallurgy, and LSA standards among many others (ASTM,
2012).
SAE’s  members  include  engineers, business executives, educators, and students
from over 97 countries. SAE holds hundreds of aerospace recommended practices and
over 6,000 aerospace standards; these standards include and are not limited to aviation
instruments, propulsion systems, wiring harnesses, and composite materials (AIA, 2005).
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Standards for defense. Military Specifications (Mil-specs) have been essential
to the aerospace industry for over 50 years. Mil-specs have not only supported the
military aerospace industry, but they have also been utilized in commercial aviation. The
end of the cold war in the late 1980s and the reduction of defense budget prompted the
U.S. government to reform military standards in 1994. The Military Specifications
Reform (MSR) mandated the review of about 29,000 military documents to eliminate the
standards that were not in use and convert standards currently being utilized in the private
sector (AIA, 2005). MSR resulted in the inactivation of 8,100 Mil-specs and standards,
the cancelation of 9,600 documents, and 3,500 Mil-specs being replaced by industry
standards (AIA, 2005). Procedures were established to create non-government standards
to replace Mil-specs and the custody of the documents was moved to two main private
sector standards developers: SAE and AIA.
The future of aerospace standardization. The aerospace industry is becoming a
global industry with companies functioning as expanded international and collaborative
partnerships (AIA, 2005). However, the standards and the processes currently utilized in
the aerospace industry are not positioned to support a global industry. Increased costs
associated with harmonization can result from a complex and often duplicative system
that is not designed for a globalized environment (AIA, 2005). In 2003, AIA established
the Future of Aerospace Working Group (FAWG). This group was tasked to examine the
aerospace standardization system processes and organizations, to define standards
systems necessary to support continued growth of the aerospace industry, and to provide
recommendations to ensure an optimum standards infrastructure for the aerospace
industry (AIA, 2005).
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One of the main findings of the FAWG was that the aerospace standards systems
are  in  danger  of  not  keeping  pace  with  the  industry’s  fast  growth.    The  working group
concluded that the U.S. needs a national aerospace standardization body that is tasked
with advocating, integrating, and facilitating the development and implementation of a
global vision and strategy that supports the development and use of global aerospace
standards (AIA, 2005). The working group also recommended that standards and
processes be developed so they serve the entire aerospace community and are used
internationally throughout the industry. These standards of choice for the global
aerospace industry must be recognized internationally and global standards should be
open for input from all stakeholders in the industry in accordance with standards set forth
by the World Trade Organization (AIA, 2005).
Summary
Aircraft certification regulations are intended to promote the airworthiness of
aircraft by requiring manufacturers of aircraft and aircraft owners to comply with
approved aircraft designs, maintenance requirements, and operational limitations to
increase the reliability of safety critical systems (CACSM, 1998). Even though the
implementation of strict certification requirements have created high standards for
aircraft manufacturers, in the last three decades, new GA aircraft certification costs have
increased, the number of GA aircraft produced has decreased, and there has been little
change in operational safety or accident rates (Bowles, 2010). The incorporation of new
technologies into old aircraft that could potentially enhance safety has become very
difficult and time consuming, as these changes would frequently require a rule change
(Part 23 ARC, 2012). New technologies such as inflatable restraints, ballistic parachutes,
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data-link weather in the cockpit, angle of attack indicators, traffic alert systems, and
terrain avoidance equipment could continue reducing GA fatalities if the technology
becomes more available and affordable (FAA, 2009).
In March, 1996, President Clinton signed Public Law 104-113, also known as the
National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA). The primary
purpose of the NTTAA is to ensure that government agencies attain greater reliance on
voluntary consensus standards developed by the private sector and decrease the
dependence on government-unique standards that were developed by, and for, the
government (National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act, 1996).
In 2004, the FAA initiated a test case with the certification of the new LSA
aircraft, utilizing consensus standards (Bowles, 2010). The American Society of Testing
and Materials (ASTM) was chosen for the implementation and management of LSA
consensus standards (ASTM, 2012). Early indicators show that the LSA category has
been a success; thus, the propagation of consensus standards to more mainstream uses has
become an appealing option applicable to other segments of aviation (FAA, 2009).
Part 23 rules have evolved from the initial set of design standards created back in
the 1920s. As time progressed, the certification regulations evolved into increasingly
comprehensive rules to address safety issues that emerged with the growing number of
aircraft in service, as well as the increasing complexity due to incorporation of new
technologies. However, these new rules were applicable to new aircraft entering the
market and to any modification or alteration of an existing airplane (Part 23 ARC, 2012).
The current regulations are very prescriptive in nature and do not allow
manufacturers to utilize alternative means of compliance or find more economical paths
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to provide the acceptable levels of safety. An Advisory Circular (AC) is relied upon to
provide interpretations of the regulations as well as a means of compliance. The
interpretation of the ACs and regulations could vary among Aircraft Certification Offices
and Manufacturing Inspection District Offices. Both the safety regulations within Part 23
as well as the ACs have historically been revised infrequently; therefore, advances in
technology have outpaced the rate at which the guidance and the regulations within
Part 23 have been updated (Part 23 ARC, 2012).
Most active aircraft in the lower tier of Part 23 were certified based on CAR 3
certification and would not be able to be certified under the current Part 23 rules without
significant additional effort; yet, these aircraft have proven to provide an acceptable level
of safety to continue operating over the last 50 to 60 years. As of 2012, the average age
of a four-seat airplane has increased to 42 years (GAMA, 2012) and manufacturers have
had difficulties introducing new safety enhancing technologies into old aircraft (Part 23
ARC, 2012).
In 2009, the FAA began a Part 23 CPS to assess the adequacy of the current
airworthiness standards (FAA, 2011b). In August 2011, following the recommendations
of the CPS, the FAA created a Part 23 ARC. The CPS recommended the reorganization
of Part 23 and the creation of tiers based on airplane performance and complexity as
opposed to the existing weight and propulsion classifications. The CPS also
recommended that certification requirements for Part 23 airplanes be written on a broad
general and progressive level of tiers based on complexity and with a level of regulatory
oversight that is consistent with this classification (FAA, 2009).
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On May 7, 2013, a bipartisan group of U.S. House of Representatives members
lead by Congressman Mike Pompeo, introduced the Small Aircraft Revitalization Act of
2013. This bill aims to establish a deadline for the implementation of the Part 23 ARC
recommendations (General Aviation Revitalization Act, 2013). According to Pompeo
(2013):  “This legislation will improve safety, decrease costs, and free private-sector
innovation to revitalize this important industry (p. 1).”
In 2013, E-AB airplanes represent the fastest growing type of aircraft in the GA
fleet (FAA, 2013a). In 2011, there were approximately 33,000 registered E-AB aircraft,
a 10% increase from 2008. As of 2010, E-AB accounted for 10% of the GA fleet, but
27% of the GA accidents. From 2009 through 2011, E-AB aircraft accounted for 14% of
airplanes in nonfatal GA accidents and approximately 21% in fatal accidents. In 2012,
the NTSB completed a safety study of E-AB aircraft. Among other findings, the NTSB
concluded that many of the accidents involving E-AB airplanes occurred in the first 50
hours of flight (NTSB, 2012b).
According to the NTSB (2012a), in 2010, GA accidents accounted for 96% of all
aviation accidents and fatalities for U.S. civil aviation. The NTSB (2012a) report
indicates that the number of GA accidents declined over the period of 2001 and 2010;
however, the accident rate for both fatal and non-fatal accidents also remained relatively
steady, because the number of hours flown have decreased during this period of time.
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The top three causes of fatal GA accidents are of interest to this study:
1. loss of control in flight,
2. controlled flight into terrain, and
3. system or component failure/power plant (Stephens, 2012).
According to the FAA (2011a), from 2010 to 2012, fatal accidents from
Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) have been reduced by more than 50% compared to
the previous three years. Fatal accidents involving Loss of Control (LOC) in flight,
during approach, and during landing have decreased 20 to 25%. The GAJSC attributes
these reductions in fatal accidents to the use of handheld technologies such as GPS with
moving maps that contain terrain, traffic information and in-flight weather capabilities
(GAJSC, 2012). New technologies such as inflatable restraints, ballistic parachutes, datalink weather in the cockpit, Angle of Attack (AOA) indicators, traffic alert systems, and
terrain avoidance equipment could continue reducing GA fatalities if these technologies
are allowed to be implemented in certified airplanes (GAJSC, 2012).
According to the GAJSC, LOC accidents at night and in IMC would drop by 50%
simply by installing autopilots in the more than 100,000 Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)
capable GA airplanes. Autopilots can be installed in experimental airplanes for as low as
$2,500; however, installing an autopilot on a certified airplane could cost at least
$10,000, which represents between 10 to 50% of the average value of a GA airplane.
The GAJSC (2012) report also recommended that the FAA apply a risk management
approach to analyze whether the current certification regulations are actually an obstacle
to installing safety enhancing technology into the GA fleet.
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In order to improve the efficiency of the certification process, decrease the cost of
certification, and allow for technological advances, the members of the Part 23
Certification ARC have suggested the implementation of industry standards. The
utilization of industry consensu standards has the potential of making the certification
approval process and the implementation of new technologies faster and more efficient
by separating the intent of the rule from the technical implementation requirements and
means of compliance (Part 23 ARC, 2012).
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Based on the literature review, the study focused on analyzing GA accidents
involving fixed-wing, single-engine, reciprocating-piston for the following reasons:
(a) piston airplanes account for 67% of the total civil aircraft population, (b) the number
of piston airplanes manufactured annually has been decreasing substantially over the last
ten years, (c) 64% of GA accidents involved personal flying in fixed-wing airplanes,
(d) 78% of personal flying was conducted in fixed-wing single-engine piston airplanes,
and (e) entry-level airplanes have been identified by the FAA as being the most affected
by the increased difficulty and cost of certification.
The research concentrated on comparing airplane accidents based on
airworthiness certification. The airworthiness categories utilized in the study were
Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA, E-LSA, and E-AB. The time period selected for the accident
occurrences was between January 1, 2004 and December 31, 2011 so as to include the
LSA category that was created in 2004. The accident causes considered were:
LOC
CFIT
Engine Failure
Structural failure
Research Approach
The study employed a mixed methods analysis that used an explanatory
sequential design consisting of two phases (Teddie & Tashakkori, 2009). The first phase
was composed of the  collection  and  analysis  of  quantitative  data  to  address  the  study’s  

64
hypotheses. The second phase consisted of the analysis of the qualitative data from the
narrative section of the accident investigation reports utilizing text mining techniques.
Design and procedures. The primary purpose of aircraft certification is to
maximize safety by minimizing the number of accidents. Accidents involving the top
three causes of accidents in GA (LOC, CFIT, and Engine Failure) were analyzed and
compared based on aircraft airworthiness certification basis. In addition, accidents due to
Structural Failure were also analyzed, as this is one of the failures or malfunctions that
aircraft certification is designed to prevent.
The research focused on the overarching hypothesis that there is no significant
difference in the frequency of accidents or in the accident rate among airplanes certified
under Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA, E-LSA, or E-AB categories in which LOC, CFIT, Engine
Failure, or Structural Failure was listed as a cause in the period between January 1, 2004
and December 31, 2011.
The quantitative portion of the study consisted of two parts. In the first part, a
Chi-Square statistical test was conducted to compare the frequencies of accidents among
airplanes certified under Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB in which LOC, CFIT,
Engine Failure, or Structural Failure was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011. If the
Chi-Square test value had a probability of less than .05 (p < .05), the null hypothesis
would be rejected. In the second part, an ANCOVA statistical test was utilized to
compare the accident rates among airplanes certified under Part 23/CAR 3,
S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB in which LOC, CFIT, Engine Failure, or Structural Failure was
listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011. If the F-statistic in the ANCOVA test had a
probability of less than .05 (p < .05), then the null hypothesis would be rejected.
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For the ANCOVA statistical test, the dependent variable used was accident rate.
The accident rate was calculated by dividing the number of accidents per year for each of
the aircraft airworthiness categories by the number of hours flown per year for each
category; these data were obtained from the GA activity survey, shown in Table 3
(GAMA, 2012). The fixed factor or independent variable used was airworthiness
certification basis. In order to account for pilot experience, design stage of the airplane,
and age of the airplane, the  number  of  hours  on  the  airplane’s  airframe and the number of
hours of total flight time of the pilot were used as covariates. Covariates are not part of
the dependent or independent variables, but have the potential to have an influence on the
dependent variable (Field, 2009).
Following the quantitative analysis, the qualitative portion of the study consisted
of the analysis of the narrative cause section of the NTSB reports for accidents in which
LOC was listed as a cause. LOC accidents are of special interest because they are the
main cause of GA accidents (Stephens, 2012). LOC is of particular interest to the FAA
as it relates to aircraft certification because the GAJSC (2012) recommended the use of
AOA indicators and autopilots to prevent LOC accidents; however, these technologies,
for the most part, must be installed in the airplane and are not available in the form of
handheld equipment. The high cost of certification and installation deters airplane
owners and operators from incorporating these technologies in small GA airplanes. The
GAJSC (2012) also stated that the cost of installing an existing AOA system on a
certified airplane is almost 10 times higher than installing the same system on an
experimental airplane.
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Table 3. Number of Aircraft and Hours Flown by Airworthiness Certification Basis.
Year

Certification Basis

2004

Part 23

2004

LSA (start of category)

2004

E-AB

2005

Part 23

2005

LSA

2005

E-AB

2006

Part 23

2006

Hours Flown

Number of Active Airplanes

15,363,000

146,613

0

0

990,000

19,165

13,739,000

148,101

9,000

170

987,000

19,817

13,976,000

145,036

LSA

66,000

1,273

2006

E-AB

899,000

19,316

2007

Part 23

13,571,000

147,569

2007

LSA

260,000

6,066

2007

E-AB

896,000

19,538

2008

Part 23

12,746,000

145,497

2008

LSA

293,000

6,811

2008

E-AB

872,000

19,767

2009

Part 23

11,730,000

140,649

2009

LSA

286,000

6,547

2009

E-AB

983,000

20,794

2010

Part 23

12,151,000

139,519

2010

LSA

311,000

6,528

2010

E-AB

911,000

21,270

2011

Part 23

13,574,031

184,706

2011

LSA

356,539

8,967

2011

E-AB

854,719

29,180

Note. Adapted from General Aviation Statistical Databook and Industry Outlook, by
GAMA, 2012.
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Text mining techniques were used to analyze the qualitative portion of the NTSB
accident reports, more specifically the narrative cause section. These narratives consisted
of a few sentences or a few paragraphs of text depending on the complexity and nature of
the accident. The information in the narrative cause section can vary within the database
as (a) different reporters may include various levels of detail, and (b) different causes and
factors leading to the accident are confined within the narrative. Text mining can help
identify sets of related words from the narrative cause portion of the report; it can also
identify clusters of similar circumstances, possible patterns, and relationships among
accidents (Nisbet, Elder, & Miner, 2009).
Apparatus and materials. Accident data from the NTSB aircraft accident
database was used for the study. The NTSB database provides information about the
type of aircraft airworthiness certificate. The NTSB variables employed for the study
were: Light-Sport Special Category (LTSP), Special Category Experimental (SPE),
Standard Acrobatic Category (STA), Standard Normal Category (STN), and Standard
Utility Category (STU). The types of aircraft certification not considered in this study
but included in the NTSB database are: Special Category Limited (SPL), Special
Category Restricted (SPR), Special Flight (SPS), Special Provisional (SPV), Special
Transport (STT), and Unknown (UNK) (NTSB, 2013). The LSA airplanes were
manually grouped into S-LSA and E-LSA utilizing information from the FAA type
certificate database. Airplanes in the Normal, Utility, and Aerobatic categories were
grouped into either Part 23 or CAR 3, based on the basis of certification; this information
was also obtained from the FAA type certificate database for fixed-wing, single-engine,
reciprocating-piston (FAA, 2013b).
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Population and Sample
The population for the study consisted of all U.S. fixed-wing, single-engine,
reciprocating-piston airplanes with maximum certificated takeoff weights of less than
12,500 pounds. The sample consisted of accidents of single-engine piston fixed-wing
airplanes with maximum certificated takeoff weights of less than 12,500 pounds in the
time period between January 1, 2004 and December 31, 2011. The airworthiness
certification categories used for the study were: (a) standard category, which also
includes normal, utility, and aerobatic; (b) LSA; and (c) amateur-built airplanes within
the experimental category. The airworthiness categories excluded from the sample were
limited, restricted, special flight, provisional, transport, and unknown. The start of the
time period selected was based on the creation of the LSA category in 2004; the end of
the time period selected was based on the availability of NTSB accident reports with a
probable cause.
Sources of the Data
The sources of data to obtain the airplane accident information were (a) a public
accessible NTSB accident database available online in Microsoft Access® format, and
(b) the FAA type certificate database. The FAA type certificate database was used to
determine the aircraft certification basis.
Data Collection
The information required for the study was acquired from the NTSB Microsoft
Access database and a Microsoft Excel® spreadsheet was created. Additional fields of
information for airworthiness certification basis such as S-LSA, E-LSA, Part 23, CAR 3,
or E-AB airplanes were manually completed utilizing information from the FAA type
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certificate database. The spreadsheet was then exported into statistical analysis software,
(Statistical Product and Service Solutions) SPSS 18® in which the data was analyzed.
The qualitative data for the study was extracted from the narrative cause section of the
NTSB accident investigation reports for LOC accidents. Data mining was performed to
analyze the qualitative portion of the NTSB accident reports employing
STATISTICA 12® software.
Reliability. Reliability refers to the ability to obtain consistent and repeatable
results. The use of NTSB and FAA data assumes the data are reliable; however, caution
was used when combining the information from the two sources of intended use: FAA
and NTSB.
Reliability was insured by employing consistent criteria for sampling and for
classifying the various causes of the accidents. In some cases, accident reports do not
clearly state the primary accident cause. In other cases there may be multiple causes
stated for any given accident.
One of the major limitations with accident rate data for GA is that the number of
hours flown per year information is obtained from the GA survey. The GA survey
collects voluntary information from aircraft owners and operators. In 2010, the FAA
began requiring owners and operators of aircraft to renew aircraft registrations every
three years to maintain a more accurate count of the number of active aircraft. In order to
test reliability in this study, a series of ANCOVA tests was performed utilizing an
alternative accident rate calculated by dividing the number of accidents per year by the
number of active aircraft that year for each aircraft certification category. These results
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were compared to the results obtained in the first ANCOVA test utilizing accident rate
using hours flown per year for each category to verify consistency.
Validity. Validity concerns for this study will most likely fall into three subcategories: (a) content, (b) construct, and (c) predictive. Each sub-category will
contribute to the overall validity of the study.
Content validity was established by properly selecting the sample group. Since
the LSA category is limited to single-engine reciprocating airplanes, the study
constrained the aircraft selection to fixed-wing, single-engine, reciprocating-piston, in
order to ensure that the data were comparable. The LSA category was introduced in
2004; however, airplanes and airplane accidents involving the LSA category did not
begin until 2005, the date range between 2004 and 2011 was selected to include a time
period in which the LSA category was available.
Construct validity was established by utilizing the same criteria to determine the
cause of the accidents. The NTSB database contains, in many cases, more than one
probable cause for each accident. The main causes of interest were LOC, CFIT, Engine
Failure, and Structural Failure. If any of these causes appeared in the NTSB Occurrences
variable (see Table 4 for Occurrences codes), then the main cause was listed as (a) LOC,
(b) CFIT, (c) Engine Failure, (d) Structural Failure, or (e) Other. If there was more than
one of these causes for the same accident, the first cause in chronological order was
selected.
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Table 4. NTSB Occurrences Codes.
NTSB
Codes
250

NTSB Description

Common Name

LOSS OF CONTROL - IN FLIGHT

LOC

220

IN FLIGHT COLLISION WITH OBJECT

CFIT

350

LOSS OF ENGINE POWER

Engine Failure

130

AIRFRAME/COMPONENT/SYSTEM

Structural Failure

FAILURE/MALFUNCTION (including in-flight
breakup)
Note. NTSB codes found on the Occurrences table/Occurrence code Adapted from
“Aviation  Accident  Database,”  by  NTSB,  2013.

Predictive validity could be affected by airplane age, airplane design stage, and pilot
experience. Since the study compared Part 23 airplanes that were most likely older than
LSA airplanes, airplane age could be a confounding variable that might influence
Structural Failure and component failure due to crack propagation in older airplanes,
stress cycles, accumulation of local damage, repairs, etc. For design stage, Part 23
aircraft have mature designs as opposed to LSA aircraft that, in some cases, have new
and unproven designs. In order to account for design stage of an airplane and age of the
airplane, the  number  of  hours  on  the  airplane’s  airframe was used as a covariate in the
ANCOVA test. Another possible confounding variable is pilot experience. To account
for pilot experience, the total flight time of the pilot was used as a covariate in the
ANCOVA test.
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The threats to internal validity can be minimized by selecting a large sample size
and a proven method. Threats to external validity can be minimized by selecting a
sample that is representative of the target population (Gliner, Morgan & Leech, 2009).
Threats to external validity could affect the ability to generalize the results to the entire
population. Since the study employed a purposeful sample, the ability to generalize to
the entire population could be reduced; however, the intent of the study was not to
generalize to Part 25 aircraft (transport category airplanes), but to generalize to fixedwing, single-engine, reciprocating-piston airplanes under 12,500 pounds. According to
Shaddish, Cook, and Campbell (2001), using purposive sampling of heterogeneous
instances benefits external validity in two ways: (a) to allow "tests of the interaction
between the causal relationship and [variable] in the study," and (b) ".... sometimes
sample sizes are so small that responsible tests of interactions cannot be done, and in any
case there will be many potential moderators that the experimenter does not think to test.
In these cases, heterogeneous sample sampling still has the benefit of demonstrating that
a main effect for treatment occurs despite the heterogeneity in the sample" (p. 92). In this
study, a small sample size will not be of concern because the estimated purposive
heterogeneous sample consisted of nearly 6,500 accidents.
Treatment of the Data
The NTSB aircraft accident database consists of a series of tables in Microsoft
Access with an event identification number being the key variable among tables. Eight
tables were merged in order to access all of the information necessary. A macro with
queries was set up in Microsoft Access to filter the data needed. Table 5 indicates the
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Table 5. Variables Utilized in the Study.
NTSB Variable Name

Variable Description

Access Table Name

ev_id

Event identification number

aircraft

Regis_no

Aircraft registration number

aircraft

Ntsb_no

NTSB accident number

aircraft

damage

Type of damage

aircraft

Acft_make

Aircraft make

aircraft

Acft_model

Aircraft model

aircraft

Cert_max_gr_wt

Maximum certificated gross weight

aircraft

Homebuilt

Is the airplane homebuilt?

aircraft

Total_seats

Total number of seats

aircraft

fixed_retractable

Fixed or retractable landing gear

aircraft

Afm_hrs

Number of hours on airframe

aircraft

Acft_awy_cert

Aircraft airworthiness certificate

Dt_aircraft

Crew_cert_code

Crew certificate code

Dt_flight_crew

Crew_cert_instruct

Flight instructor on-board?

Dt_flight_crew

Engine_type

Type of engine

engine

Engine_mfgr

Engine manufacturer

engine

Eng_model

Engine model

engine

Power_units

Units for engine power

engine

Hp_or_lbs

Horse-power or pounds?

engine

Carb_fuel_injection

Carbureted or fuel injected?

engine

Ev_type

Type of event

events

Ev_year

Year of event

events

Ev_month

Month of event

events

Occurrence_code

Occurrence code

Event_sequence

Occurrence_description

Occurrence description

Event_sequence

Flight_hours

Pilot total number of hours

Flight_time

Narr_cause

Cause narrative

narratives
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tables and variables utilized for the analysis and the Microsoft Access table where the
variables can be found within the NTSB database.
Standard airworthiness category airplanes or airplanes certified under Part 23 or
CAR 3 could fall under either of the following categories: Normal, Experimental, or
Aerobatic; therefore, all three categories were combined. The NTSB database does not
differentiate between S-LSA and E-LSA; therefore, the specific LSA categorization
information was entered manually from the information on the type certificate data sheet
database. The NTSB database does not differentiate between the different types of
experimental airplanes; however, the database has an additional variable that
differentiates among airplanes that are amateur built. Therefore, to analyze E-AB
airplanes, all Experimental category airplanes were selected and then the data was filtered
to obtain Amateur-Built airplanes only. The data was filtered to include Part 91
operations, fixed-wing airplanes, maximum certificated gross weight under 12,500
pounds, U.S. registered aircraft only, single-engine, and reciprocating. The NTSB codes
for the occurrences that were analyzed are shown in Table 4.
Descriptive statistics. Descriptive statistics constitute an essential part of the
analysis in this study. Some of the descriptive statistics that were utilized for the analysis
include percentiles, frequencies, and graphs. Table 6 lists the variables that were utilized
and the type of descriptive statistics.
Reliability testing. Reliability refers to the ability of a measure to produce
consistent results when some of the entities are measured under different conditions
(Field, 2009). In order to test reliability in this study, a series of ANCOVA statistical
tests was performed utilizing an alternative accident rate calculated by dividing the
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Table 6. Variables Utilized for Descriptive Statistics.
Type of Descriptive Statistics
Mean, Median, Mode, Standard Deviation, Skewness,

Frequencies

Kurtosis, Maximum, Minimum, Percentiles
Cert_max_gr_wt

Acft_make

Total_seats

Acft_model

Afm_hrs

Homebuilt

Flight_hours

Acft_awy_cert
Crew_cert_code
Crew_cert_instruct
Engine_type
Engine_mfgr
Carb_fuel_injection
Ev_type
Ev_year
Ev_month

number of accidents per year by the number of active aircraft that year for each aircraft
certification category. The results were compared to verify consistency of the results
obtained in the first ANCOVA test utilizing accident rate using hours flown per year for
each category.
Hypothesis testing. The purpose of this study was to analyze the frequency of GA
airplane accidents and accident rates on the basis of aircraft certification to determine
whether or not differences in aircraft certification rules had an influence on accidents.
The certification categories examined were: Part 23, CAR 3, LSA, and E-AB. The
accident causes examined were those listed as: LOC, CFIT, Engine Failure, and
Structural Failure in the time period between January 1, 2004, and December 31, 2011.
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The hypotheses were:
H01: There is no significant difference in the frequency of accidents among
airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard
to accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011.
If the Chi-Square test value had a probability of less than .05 (p < .05), then the
null hypothesis would be rejected.
H02: There is no significant difference in the frequency of accidents among
airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard
to accidents in which CFIT was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011.
If the Chi-Square test value had a probability of less than .05 (p < .05), then the
null hypothesis would be rejected.
H03: There is no significant difference in the frequency of accidents among
airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard
to accidents in which Engine Failure was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011.
If the Chi-Square test value had a probability of less than .05 (p < .05), then the
null hypothesis would be rejected.
H04: There is no significant difference in the frequency of accidents among
airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard
to accidents in which Structural Failure was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011.
If the Chi-Square test value had a probability of less than .05 (p < .05), then the
null hypothesis would be rejected.
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H05: There is no significant difference in the accident rate among airplanes
certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard to
accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011.
If the F-statistic in the ANCOVA test has a probability of less than .05 (p < .05),
then the null hypothesis would be rejected.
H06: There is no significant difference in the accident rate among airplanes
certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard to
accidents in which CFIT was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011.
If the F-statistic in the ANCOVA test has a probability of less than .05 (p < .05),
then the null hypothesis would be rejected.
H07: There is no significant difference in the accident rate among airplanes
certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard to
accidents in which Engine Failure was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011.
If the F-statistic in the ANCOVA test has a probability of less than .05 (p < .05),
then the null hypothesis would be rejected.
H08: There is no significant difference in the accident rate among airplanes
certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB categories with regard to
accidents in which Structural Failure was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011.
If the F-statistic in the ANCOVA test has a probability of less than .05 (p < .05),
then the null hypothesis would be rejected.
Qualitative data. The qualitative data for the study was extracted from the
narrative cause section of the NTSB accident investigation reports. The qualitative
results helped explain the initial quantitative results (Teddie & Tashakkori, 2009). Text
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mining techniques were utilized to help analyze the qualitative portion of the NTSB
accident reports.
The Text Mining function of the STATISTICA Data Mining Software was
utilized to analyze the dataset. This text mining function aids in the identification of the
main words encountered in the document along with their frequency. A variety of plots
are available including a scree plot and a scatter plot. The scree plot indicates the
different dimensions and the percentage of the total variance. The elbow or point of
inflection of the scree plot indicates the words that appear most frequently. The scatter
plot allows for the identification of word groups or clusters.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
The purpose of this study was to analyze the frequency of GA airplane accidents
and accident rates on the basis of aircraft certification to determine whether or not
differences in aircraft certification rules had an influence on accidents. In addition, the
narrative cause descriptions contained within the accident reports were analyzed to
determine whether there were differences in the qualitative data for the different
certification categories. The certification categories examined were: Part 23, CAR 3,
LSA, and E-AB. The accident causes examined were those listed as: LOC, CFIT, Engine
Failure, and Structural Failure in the time period between January 1, 2004, and December
31, 2011.
The population for the study consisted of all U.S. fixed-wing, single-engine,
reciprocating-piston airplanes with maximum certificated takeoff weights of less than
12,500 pounds. The sample consisted of accidents of single-engine piston fixed-wing
airplanes with maximum certificated takeoff weights of less than 12,500 pounds in the
time period between January 1, 2004 and December 31, 2011. The airworthiness
certification categories included in the sample were: (a) standard category, which also
includes normal, utility and aerobatic; (b) LSA; and (c) amateur-built airplanes within the
experimental category. The airworthiness categories excluded from the sample were:
limited, restricted, special flight, provisional, transport, and unknown.
Treatment of the Data and Procedures
The NTSB accident database was used for the study (NTSB, 2013). A series of
queries was performed in Microsoft Access in order to merge the tables needed for the
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analysis. One of the main challenges of merging the Access database tables was that
many duplicates were created for the same record or event as each variable could have
more than one option; for example, under pilot certificate, the pilot can have a private,
instrument, and commercial certificate, which resulted in three records for the same
accident. The following tables were merged without any additional duplicates being
created: (a) Aircraft, (b) Engines, (c) Events, and (d) Narratives. Table 7 indicates the
criteria utilized to merge the rest of the tables without creating duplicates.

Table 7. Criteria Utilized to Merge Access Database Tables.
Variable Name

Access Table Name

Criteria

Aft_awy_cert

Dt_aircraft

If STN, STU, or STA at the same time,
then replace with STN and delete
duplicate field-

Crew_cert_code

Dt_flight_crew

Crew_cert_instructor Dt_flight_crew

Highest rating only, only one pilot
If more than one for the same event_id,
then merge & separate with comma

Occur_code

event_sequence

If more than one for the same event_id,
then merge & separate with comma

Occur_descr

event_sequence

If more than one for the same event_id,
then merge & separate with comma

Phase_no

event_sequence

If more than one for the same event_id,
then merge & separate with comma -

Finding_no

findings

If more than one for the same event_id,
then merge & separate with comma

Finding_description

findings

If more than one for the same event_id,
then merge & separate with comma

Flight_hours

flight_time

Use total flight time only (TOTL ALL)
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The initial process of merging the required tables resulted in 6,583 unique
records. Two variables were created in order to satisfy the two criteria of major interest:
certification basis and main cause of accident. The NTSB variable for Aircraft
Airworthiness Certificate Codes (Aft_awy_cert) was used to complete the new
certification basis variable. If Aft_awy_cert was STN (standard category), then these
fields were manually completed as either Part 23 or CAR 3 by looking at the FAA type
certificate datasheet. If Aft_awy_cert was LTSP (light sport), then the certification field
was manually completed as either S-LSA or E-LSA after verification with the FAA type
certificate datasheet. Records that were missing airworthiness information were
manually completed by either examining the aircraft make and model and then the type
certificate datasheet or by examining the registration number on the FAA aircraft
certification database; a total of 278 records were manually completed. Another 28
additional records resulted in unknown certification basis, most of which belonged to
unmanned vehicles or to airplanes with an aircraft certification basis that did not meet the
original criteria such as experimental non-amateur built or restricted. These records were
not included in the analysis. Airplanes certified under rules preceding CAR 3
certification rules such as: Bulletin 7, Bulletin 7A, CAR 4, or CAR 4a were grouped
under CAR 3 aircraft certification basis.
The codes from the NTSB variable Occurrence Code (Occurrence_code) were
used to begin completing the fields of the main cause of accident variable. The main
causes of interest were: LOC, CFIT, Engine Failure, or Structural Failure. If any of these
causes appeared in the NTSB Occurrences variable (see Table 5 for Occurrence codes),
then the main cause was listed as: (a) LOC, (b) CFIT, (c) Engine Failure, (d) Structural
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Failure, or (e) Other. If there was more than one of these causes for the same accident,
for example in the case of Engine Failure and LOC for the same accident, then the first
cause in chronological order was selected as listed in the NTSB database. A cause was
not stated for approximately 800 records. For these, the narratives were manually
examined to determine the cause and the cause was then entered into the data. A total of
6,455 accidents met the initial airworthiness certification criteria of this study. The total
number of accidents involving the accident causes of interest for this study was 3,023
(see Table 8). Only these 3,023 accidents were utilized for the analyses to address the
hypotheses. However, in some cases all of the accidents were utilized to obtain general
information about all accidents involving the different airworthiness certification
categories studied between 2004 and 2011 as shown in Tables 8 and 9. At the end of the
above described data collection process, there were no missing data for the aircraft
airworthiness certification or accident cause fields. For any other variable, only records
that had no missing data were used. Table 9 shows the frequency of accidents by cause
and certification basis for all accidents that met the criteria of the study.
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Table 8. Frequency of Main Accident Cause for all Accidents from 2004-2011.
Main Accident Cause

Frequency

LOC

1,155

CFIT

563

Engine Failure

973

Structural Failure

332

Total for LOC, CFIT, Engine Failure & Structural Failure

3,023

Other

3,432

Grand Total

6,455

Table 9. Frequency of Accidents by Cause and Certification Basis for all Accidents from
2004-2011.
Cause/Cert. Basis

CAR 3 Part 23

E-AB

S-LSA

E-LSA

Total/Cause

LOC

618

196

266

41

34

1,155

CFIT

405

76

75

6

1

563

Eng. Fail.

587

127

216

15

28

973

Str.Fail.

176

51

91

11

3

332

Total

1,786

450

648

73

66

3,023

Other

2,258

588

467

78

41

3,432

Total/ Cert. Basis

4,044

1,038

1,115

151

107

6,455

Descriptive Statistics
The Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 10. Some information such as the
number of hours on the airframe was missing for many NTSB accident reports; however,
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this variable was not one of the critical variables utilized in the study. Therefore, the
average of the hours on the airframe per year was calculated with the available data and
utilized as a covariate.

Table 10. Descriptive Statistics.
Certificated Weight Airframe Hours
Valid

Pilot Hours

No. of Seats

3,023

2,571

2,951

2,994

0

452

72

29

Mean

2,271.98

3,260.46

2,929.62

3.23

Median

2,300.00

2,740.00

961.00

4.00

Mode

2,300

Missing

SD

0

1,000

4

935.45

3,572.64

5,336.42

1.40

Skewness

1.05

6.72

3.53

.51

Kurtosis

6.23

133.42

15.20

Min

-.29

388

0

0

25 Percentile

1,600.00

601.00

334.00

2.00

50 Percentile

2,300.00

2,740.00

961.00

4.00

75 Percentile

2,900.00

4,598.00

2800.00

4.00

Max.

12,000

89,118

55,000

1

11

Table 11 provides information about the number of hours on the airframe and the
pilot total flight time by certification category. S-LSA, E-LSA, and E-AB airplanes are
on average newer than Part 23 and CAR 3 airplanes. The average pilot flight times did
not differ substantially. As expected, the CAR 3 airplanes average number on hours on
the airframe was higher than the other categories because these airplanes are the oldest
airplanes.
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Table 11. Descriptive Statistics for Airframe Hours and Pilot Hours by Aircraft
Certification Categories.
Cert. Basis
CAR 3

PART 23

E-AB

E-LSA

S-LSA

Covariate

Valid

Min

Max

Mean

SD

Airframe Hours

1,541

25

89,118

3,884.00

3,758.65

Pilot Hours

1,749

0

55,000

3,041.09

5,601.17

Airframe Hours

408

3

12,616

2,272.62

2,089.72

Pilot Hours

445

0

49,800

2,535.31

4,624.89

Airframe Hours

509

0

19,611

412.31

1,066.85

Pilot Hours

624

0

33,000

2,840.22

4,853.78

Airframe Hours

48

0

12,691

495.08

1,808.81

Pilot Hours

61

10

31,270

3,857.84

7,465.82

Airframe Hours

64

0

3,542

312.28

533.57

Pilot Hours

71

8

25,000

2,652.01

4,621.59

Table 12 provides the frequency and type of pilot certificate, as well as whether
there was an instructor on-board. As Table 12 shows, 54% of the pilots in the sample had
at least a private pilot certificate, 26% had a commercial certificate, and 10% had an
ATP. Only 0.2% or 5 accidents had unknown or missing information about the pilot
certificate. An instructor was on-board in 22% of the sample accidents. Figure 11
illustrates the frequency and percentage distribution of the pilot certificate type of the
sample pilots.
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Table 12. Frequency of Pilot Certificate Type and Instructor On-board.
Pilot Certificate Type

Frequency

Private

1,639

Percent
54.2

Commercial

787

26

ATP

349

10.8

Student

137

4.5

None

59

2.0

Sport

44

1.5

Unknown

5

.2

Recreational

2

.1

Foreign

1

.0

3,023

100.0

Instructor on-board

Frequency

Percent

No

2,359

78

664

22

Total

Yes

Pilot Certificate Type
44; 1%

137; 5%

ATP

2; 0%

COMMERCIAL

349; 12%

FOREIGN
NONE
UNKNOWN

787; 26%
1,639; 54%

PRIVATE
1; 0%
59; 2%
5; 0%

Figure 11. Frequency and percentage of pilot certificate type.

RECREATIONAL
SPORT
STUDENT
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The extent of airplane damage, from None to Destroyed, is illustrated by the data
of Table 13. In 82% of the accidents, substantial damage occurred.

Table 13. Frequency of Aircraft Damage Type.
Type of Damage

Frequency

Percent

Substantial

2,487

82.3

Destroyed

504

16.7

Minor

22

.7

None

10

.3

Total

3,023

100.0

The frequency of accidents by cause is displayed in Figure 12. Airplanes certified
under CAR 3 rules account for 53.5%, or 618 of the accidents in which LOC was listed
as a cause between the period of January 1, 2004 and December 31, 2011. Airplanes
certified under CAR 3 rules also account for 62.65% of the total accidents within the
same period.
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Frequency of Accidents
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0

CAR 3
Part 23
E-AB
S-LSA
E-LSA
LOC

CFIT

Engine Failure Structural Failure

Figure 12. Frequency of accidents by cause and certification basis.

The frequencies of accidents by month are displayed in Figure 13. Not
surprisingly, flight activity level increases during the summer months and as a result so
does the accident frequency. Even though the number of total accidents per year has
decreased in the period between 2008 and 2011 (see Figure 14), the accident rates have
remained relatively constant as the number of hours flown per year has decreased (see
Figure 15).

Number of Accidents

Number of Accidents per Month
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

No. of Accidents 175 170 194 281 272 316 357 348 278 253 212 167

Figure 13. Frequency of accidents by month.
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Number of Accidents per Year
600
Number of Accidents

500
400
300
200
100
0
Number of Accidents

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

481

447

384

407

356

335

309

304

Figure 14. Frequency of accidents by year.

The general trend of the rate of accidents by certification basis for Part 23/CAR 3
certified airplanes has remained nearly constant, as shown in Figure 15. The large spike
in the accident rate for LSA can be attributed to the start of the category in 2004;
production of LSA airplanes began in 2005 with only 3 accidents and 9,000 hours flown
that year in the LSA category.

35

Accident Rate*100,000
(Accidents/Year)

30
25
PART23/CAR3

20

S-LSA/E-LSA

15

E-AB

10
5
0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Figure 15. Accident rate by year and certification basis for study sample.
Note: The accident rate is given in number of accidents per year per 100,000 hours.

90
Table 14 shows the frequency of accidents, number of active aircraft, hours
flown, and accident rate by certification basis. Figure16 shows the accident rate by
accident cause and certification basis. The accident rate for the LSA and E-AB
categories for accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause is higher than for Part 23
category airplanes, even though Part 23 airplanes account for 814 accidents in which
LOC was listed as a cause and LSA airplanes were only involved in 75 accidents in
which LOC was listed as a cause between the years of 2004 and 2011. The higher
accident rate for LSA airplanes is attributed to the much lower number of estimated hours
flown during the same period. The accident rates for Part 23 and LSA airplanes in which
CFIT was listed as a cause are nearly equal.

Table 14. Frequency of Accidents, Active Airplanes, Hours Flown, and Accident Rate by
Cause and Certification Basis for 2004-2011.
Accident Cause
LOC

CFIT

Engine Failure

Structural
Failure

Cert. Basis
PART 23/CAR 3
LSA
E-AB
PART 23/CAR 3
LSA
E-AB
PART 23/CAR 3
LSA
E-AB
PART 23/CAR 3
LSA
E-AB

No.
accidents
814
75
266
481
7
75
714
43
187
227
14
113

Hours Flown
106,850,031
1,581,539
7,392,719
106,850,031
1,581,539
7,392,719
106,850,031
1,581,539
7,392,719
106,850,031
1,581,539
7,392,719

No. Active
Airplanes
149,711
4,545
21,106
149,711
4,545
21,106
149,711
4,545
21,106
149,711
4,545
21,106

Accident
Rate
7.62E-06
4.74E-05
3.60E-05
4.50E-06
4.43E-06
1.01E-05
6.68E-06
2.72E-05
2.53E-05
2.12E-06
8.85E-06
1.53E-05

Accident Rate * 100,000
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PART 23/CAR 3

5.00
4.50
4.00
3.50
3.00
2.50
2.00
1.50
1.00
0.50
0.00

S-LSA/E-LSA
E-AB

LOC

CFIT

Engine Failure

Structural Failure

Figure 16. Accident rate by accident cause and certification basis.
Note: The accident rate is given in number of accidents per year per 100,000 hours.

Hypothesis Testing
The evaluation of eight hypotheses under investigation was conducted utilizing
two main statistical methods: Chi-Square test and ANCOVA test. Discussion of the
statistical significance of the hypotheses follows.
To address hypotheses one through four, Chi-Square tests were performed to
determine whether the different causes of accidents were distributed differently across
certification basis categories; therefore, the null hypotheses were: there is no significant
difference in the frequency of accidents among airplanes certified under Part 23, CAR 3,
S-LSA/E-LSA or E-AB in which LOC, CFIT, Engine Failure, or Structural Failure was
listed as a cause between the years of 2004 and 2011. Since only the accident
frequencies were utilized for the Chi-Square test, the amount of activity or number of
active airplanes for each category was not taken into account. The Chi-Square test
compares the observed and expected frequencies; the test determines if the expected
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values differ significantly from the observed values (George & Mallery, 2011). The
assumptions of the Chi-Square test were verified; these assumptions are: independence of
observations and appropriate size of expected frequencies. Initially, more than 20% of
the cells had expected frequencies of less than five because the LSA category was new
and few accidents occurred in 2004 and 2005. To resolve the assumption violation, the
S-LSA and E-LSA categories were grouped together and the data were grouped into
two-year segments covering the period from 2004 to 2011. For CFIT accidents, four
cells or 25% of the expected counts had values of less than five; for LOC accidents, four
cells or 25% of the expected counts had values of less than five. The sample consisted of
3,023 accidents; since the sample size was large the approximation of the Chi-Square
distribution improves and the low expected counts are not as problematic (Field, 2009).
The Chi-Square test indicated that there was a significant difference in the
frequency of accidents in which LOC and Engine Failure was listed as a cause; there was
no significant difference in the frequency of accidents in which CFIT or Structural
Failure (see Table 15). The Chi-Square test also indicated that there is a significant
difference in the frequency of accidents among Part 23, CAR 3 and E-AB categories;
however, the results indicated no significant difference in the frequency of accidents for
the S-LSA/E-LSA category (see Appendix C1).
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Table 15. Chi-Square Test by Year and Accident Cause.
Accident Cause
Value
65.75

LOC

Pearson Chi-Square

H0 1

N of Valid Cases

CFIT

Pearson Chi-Square

16.62

H0 2

N of Valid Cases

563

Engine Failure

Pearson Chi-Square

31.34

H0 3

N of Valid Cases

973

Structural Failure Pearson Chi-Square
H0 4

N of Valid Cases

Asymp. Sig.
df
(2-sided)
9
.000

1155

14.44

9

.055

9

.000

9

.108

332

H01. The null hypothesis tested was that there is no significant difference in the
frequency of accidents among airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA,
or E-AB categories with regard to accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause from
2004 to 2011. The Chi-Square test result  was  χ2 = 65.75, df = 9, and p = .000; therefore,
the null hypothesis was rejected.
For CAR 3 airplanes, there were 618 LOC accidents between 2004 and 2011,
with a decreasing trend of 105 accidents in 2004 to 59 accidents in 2011 that represents a
43% decrease in seven years. For CAR 3 airplanes, the standardized residual that fell
outside of the ± 1.96 range was for the years 2004/2005 with a value of 2.4; the actual
number of accidents were higher than the expected values for that period.
For Part 23 airplanes, there were 196 LOC accidents between 2004 and 2011,
with a decreasing trend of 28 accidents in 2004 to 19 accidents in 2011 that represents a
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32% decrease in seven years. For Part 23 airplanes, there were no standardized residuals
that fell outside of ± 1.96 range.
For E-AB airplanes, there were 266 LOC accidents between 2004 and 2011, with
a decreasing trend of 41 accidents in 2004 to 19 accidents in 2011 that represents a 53%
decrease in seven years. For E-AB airplanes, there were no standardized residuals that
fell outside of ± 1.96 range.
As expected, there was an increase in LOC accidents for the S-LSA/E-LSA
category from 0 accidents in 2004 to 18 accidents in 2011 with a total of 75 LOC
accidents between 2004 and 2011. For S-LSA/E-LSA airplanes, the standardized
residuals that fell outside of ± 1.96 range were for the years 2004/2005 with a
standardized residual value of -4.6, 2005/2006 with a standardized residual value of 2.1,
and 2010/2011 with standardized residual value of 4.5; the negative value of the
2004/2005 residual indicates that the actual number of accidents was lower than
expected. During 2005/2006 and 2010/2011, the actual number of accidents was higher
than the expected.
H02. The null hypothesis tested was that there is no significant difference in the
frequency of accidents among airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA,
or E-AB categories with regard to accidents in which CFIT was listed as a cause from
2004 to 2011. The Chi-Square test result  was  χ2 = 16.62, df = 9, and p = .055; therefore,
the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. Even though the p value is very close to 0.05,
the data shows that the cells that provided inputs into the Chi-Square value was for the
S-LSA/E-LSA category because the category had fewer than expected accidents.
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For CAR 3 airplanes, there were 405 CFIT accidents between 2004 and 2011,
with a decreasing trend of 107 accidents in 2004 to 14 accidents in 2011 that represents
an 86% decrease in seven years. For CAR 3 airplanes, there were no standardized
residuals that fell outside of ± 1.96 range.
For Part 23 airplanes, there were 76 CFIT accidents between 2004 and 2011, with
a decreasing trend of 12 accidents in 2004 to 3 accidents in 2011 that represents a 75%
decrease in seven years. For Part 23 airplanes, there were no standardized residuals that
fell outside of ± 1.96 range.
For E-AB airplanes, there were 75 CFIT accidents between 2004 and 2011, with a
decreasing trend of 21 accidents in 2004 to 3 accidents in 2011 that represents an 85%
decrease in seven years. For E-AB airplanes, there were no standardized residuals that
fell outside of ± 1.96 range.
There were a total of seven CFIT accidents for the S-LSA/E-LSA between 2004
and 2011. For S-LSA/E-LSA airplanes, the standardized residual for the years
2008/2009 fell outside of ± 1.96 range with a standardized residual value of 2.6;
therefore, there were more accidents than expected.
H03. The null hypothesis tested was that there is no significant difference in the
frequency of accidents among airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA,
or E-AB categories with regard to accidents in which Engine Failure was listed as a cause
from 2004 to 2011. The Chi-Square test result  was  χ2 = 31.34, df = 9, and p = .000;
therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected.
For CAR 3 airplanes, there were 587 Engine Failure accidents between 2004 and
2011, with a decreasing trend of 81 accidents in 2004 to 76 accidents in 2011 that
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represents a 6% decrease in seven years. For CAR 3 airplanes, the standardized residual
that fell outside of ± 1.96 range was for the years 2004/2005 with a standardized value of
1.9; the actual number of accidents was higher than the expected values during this
period.
For Part 23 airplanes, there were 27 Engine Failure accidents between 2004 and
2011, with an increasing trend of 8 accidents in 2004 to 24 accidents in 2011 that
represents a 200% increase in seven years. For Part 23 airplanes, there were no
standardized residuals that fell outside of ± 1.96 range.
For E-AB airplanes, there were 216 Engine Failure accidents between 2004 and
2011, with an increasing trend of 21 accidents in 2004 to 35 accidents in 2011 that
represents a 66% increase in seven years. For E-AB airplanes, there were no
standardized residuals that fell outside of ± 1.96 range.
As expected, there was an increase in Engine Failure accidents for the
S-LSA/E-LSA category from 0 accidents in 2004 to 8 accidents in 2011 with a total of 43
Engine Failure accidents between 2004 and 2011. For S-LSA/E-LSA airplanes, the
standardized residuals that fell outside of ± 1.96 range were for the years 2004/2005 with
a standardized residual value of -3.2, and 2010/2011 with a standardized residual value of
2.6; the actual number of accidents during 2004/2005 were lower than expected and
during 2010/2011 were higher than the expected.
H04. The null hypothesis tested was that there is no significant difference in the
frequency of accidents among airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA,
or E-AB categories with regard to accidents in which Structural Failure was listed as a
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cause from 2004 to 2011. The Chi-Square test result  was  χ2 = 14.44, df = 28, and
p = .108; therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected.
For CAR 3 airplanes, there were 34 Structural Failure accidents between 2004
and 2011, with a decreasing trend of 34 accidents in 2004 to 12 accidents in 2011 that
represents a 64% decrease in seven years. For CAR 3 airplanes, there were no
standardized residuals that fell outside of ± 1.96 range.
For PART 23 airplanes, there were 51 Structural Failure accidents between 2004
and 2011, with a decreasing trend of 10 accidents in 2004 to 1 accident in 2011 that
represents a 90% decrease in seven years. For Part 23 airplanes, there were no
standardized residuals that fell outside of ± 1.96 range.
For the E-AB airplanes, there were 91 Structural Failure accidents between 2004
and 2011, with a increasing trend of 3 accidents in 2004 to 11 accidents in 2011 that
represents a 266% increase in seven years. For E-AB airplanes, there were no
standardized residuals that fell outside of ± 1.96 range.
There were a total of 14 Structural Failure accidents for the S-LSA/E-LSA
between 2004 and 2011. For S-LSA/E-LSA airplanes, the standardized residual that fell
outside of ± 1.96 range was for the years 2004/2005 with a standardized value of -2.1; the
actual number of accidents during 2004/2005 were lower than expected.
To address hypotheses five through eight a series of one way factorial ANOVA
statistical tests with covariates—ANCOVA—was performed. The hypotheses attempted
to determine whether there is a significant difference in the accident rates among
airplanes certified under Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB in which LOC, CFIT,
Engine Failure, or Structural Failure was listed as a cause after controlling for pilot flight
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time  and  number  of  hours  on  the  aircraft’s  airframe.    The  CAR 3 and Part 23 as well as
the S-LSA and E-LSA categories were combined respectively for this analysis as the total
hours per year used to calculate the accident rate were only available for the combined
categories. The following assumptions were verified: (a) independence of observations,
(b) normal distribution of the dependent variable, (c) homogeneity of variances, and
(d) linear relationship between the covariates and the dependent variable. All the
assumptions for the one-way factorial ANCOVA were met; however, the dependent
variable (accident rate) was skewed to the right with a level of skewness of 2.42 and
kurtosis of 6.11. Therefore, it was not normally distributed. The skewness to the right
can be attributed to the fact that there are no negative accident rates. The factorial
ANCOVA analysis is robust against violations of the normality assumption of the
dependent variable. In order to meet the requirements of the ANCOVA test, it was
necessary to segregate the data into two-year segments covering the period from 2004 to
2011. Therefore, the number of variables or levels were summarized to eight levels, four
levels for the dependent variable and four levels for the independent variable. These
variables used in the ANCOVA test are shown in Appendices C2-C5.
H05. For accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause, the Levene’s  test  of  
equality of error variances, which tests the homogeneity of variances was not significant
with p =.053; therefore, the assumption was met. The null hypothesis tested was that
there is no significant difference in the accident rate among airplanes certified in the
Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB, with regard to accidents in which LOC was
listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011. The main effect, aircraft certification basis, was not
statistically significant with F(2, 3) = .71, p = .560. Therefore, there was no significant
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difference among aircraft accidents based on aircraft certification basis in accidents in
which LOC was listed as a cause. The interactions between pilot flight time and time on
the airframe with aircraft certification basis were also not significant. The F-statistic in
the ANCOVA test had a probability greater than .05 (p = .560); therefore, the null
hypothesis failed to be rejected (see Table 16).

Table 16. ANCOVA as  a  Function  of  Certification  Basis  with  Hours  on  the  Airplane’s  
Airframe and Pilot Total Flight Time as Covariates for LOC Accidents.
𝛈𝟐

Source

df

MS

Cert. Basis

2

1.90E-10

.71

.560

.32

.56

Cert. Basis * pilot flt. time

3

3.86E-10

1.44

.386

.59

.77

Cert. Basis * airframe time

3

7.52E-10

2.80

.210

.74

.86

Error

3

2.69E-10

F

Sig.

eta

H06. For accidents in which CFIT was listed as a cause, the  Levene’s test of
equality of error variances, which tests the homogeneity of variances, was not significant
with p = .097; therefore, the assumption was met. The null hypothesis tested was that
there is no significant difference in the accident rate among airplanes certified in the Part
23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA or E-AB, with regard to accidents in which CFIT was listed as
a cause from 2004 to 2011. For the main effect, certification basis F(2, 2) = 3.84,
p = .207. Therefore, there was no significant difference among aircraft accidents based
certification policy in which CFIT was listed as a cause. The interactions between pilot
flight time and time on the airframe were also not significant. The F-statistic in the
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ANCOVA test had a probability greater than .05 (p = .207); therefore, the null hypothesis
failed to be rejected (see Table 17).

Table 17. ANCOVA as  a  Function  of  Certification  Basis  with  Hours  on  the  Airplane’s  
Airframe and Pilot Total Flight Time as Covariates for CFIT Accidents.
𝛈𝟐

Source

df

MS

F

Sig.

Cert. Basis

2

2.56E-11

3.84

.207

.79

.88

Cert. Basis * pilot flt. time

3

5.33E-11

7.98

.113

.92

.95

Cert. Basis * airframe time

3

.00

1.000

.00

.00

Error

2

.00

eta

6.68E-12

H07. For accidents in which Engine Failure was listed as a cause, the  Levene’s  
test of equality of error variances, which tests the homogeneity of variances was not
significant with p =.247; therefore, the assumption was met. The null hypothesis tested
was that there is no significant difference in the accident rate among airplanes certified in
the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA or E-AB, with regard to accidents in which Engine
Failure was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011. In this case, there was a significant
difference in the accident rates among airplanes certified under Part 23/CAR 3,
S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB in which engine failure was listed as a cause, F(2,3) =105.36,
p =.002, eta = 0.99. Therefore, there were significant differences in the accident rates
among the different aircraft certification categories, and the effect size was large. There
was also a significant interaction between the effects of the number of total flight time of
the pilot and on the number  of  hours  on  the  airplane’s  airframe (see Table 18).
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Table 18. ANCOVA as  a  Function  of  Certification  Basis  with  Hours  on  the  Airplane’s  
Airframe and Pilot Total Flight Time as Covariates for Engine Failure Accidents.
𝛈𝟐

Source

df

MS

F

Sig.

Cert. Basis

2

2.123E-10

105.36

.002

.986

.99

Cert. Basis * pilot flt. time

3

1.19E-10

59.21

.004

.983

.99

Cert. Basis * airframe time

3

8.91E-11

44.24

.006

.978

.98

Error

3

2.01E-12

eta

The estimated marginal means plot indicated that there was a large difference
between E AB and Part 23/CAR 3 accident rates when engine failure was listed as a
cause; however, there was not a large difference in the estimated marginal means
between airplanes certified under S-LSA/E-LSA or Part 23/CAR 3. The pairwise
comparison confirmed that there was a significant difference between E-AB and
Part 23/CAR 3 airplanes (p = .011), and between E-AB and S-LSA/E-LSA airplanes
(p = .016); however, there was no significant difference between Part 23/CAR 3 and
S-LSA/E-LSA airplanes (p = .424) with regards to the means of the accident rates in
which Engine Failure was listed as a cause. The estimated marginal means plot in
Figure 17 displays the difference. The F-statistic in the ANCOVA test had a probability
lower than .05 (p = .002); therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected.
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Figure 17. Estimated marginal means plot for Part 23, E-AB, and LSA certified aircraft
accident rate for Engine Failure accidents.

H08. For accidents in which Structural Failure was listed as a cause, the  Levene’s  
test of equality of error variances, which tests the homogeneity of variances, was not
significant with p =.081; therefore, the assumption was met. The null hypothesis tested
was that there is no significant difference in the accident rate among airplanes certified in
the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA or E-AB, with regard to accidents in which Structural
Failure was listed as a cause from 2004 to 2011. For the main effect certification basis,
F(2, 3) = 0, p = 1.00. Therefore, there was no significant difference among aircraft
accidents based certification policy in which Structural Failure was listed as a cause. The
interactions between pilot flight time and time on the airframe with aircraft certification
basis were also not significant. The F-statistic in the ANCOVA test had a probability
greater than .05 (p= 1.00); therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected (see
Table 19).
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Table 19. ANCOVA as  a  Function  of  Certification  Basis  with  Hours  on  the  Airplane’s  
Airframe and Pilot Total Flight Time as Covariates for Structural Failure Accidents.
Source

df

Cert. Basis

2

F

Sig.

.00

.00

1.00

.00

.00

Cert. Basis * pilot flt. time 3

.00

.00

1.00

.00

.00

Cert. Basis * airframe time 3

.00

.00

1.00

.00

.00

Error

3

MS

η

eta

1.57E-11

Reliability Testing
Reliability refers to the ability to obtain consistent and repeatable results.
Reliability of this study was insured by employing consistent criteria for sampling and
classification of the cause of the accident and certification basis for the different
categories of aircraft.
In order to test reliability in this study, a series of ANCOVA tests was performed
utilizing an alternative accident rate calculated by dividing the number of accidents per
year by the number of active aircraft that year for each aircraft certification category.
The results were compared to verify consistency of the results obtained in the first
ANCOVA test utilizing accident rate using hours flown per year for each category.
The results using the alternative accident rate by number of active airplanes per
year were consistent with the previous results utilizing accident rate calculated with
number of hours flown per year. The alternative ANCOVA results for LOC were:
F(2, 3) = .71, p = .560, indicating that there was no significant difference among aircraft
accidents based certification policy in which LOC was listed as a cause. The interactions
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between pilot flight time and time on the airframe with aircraft certification basis also
were not significant. The alternative ANCOVA results for CFIT were: F(2, 3) = 0,
p = 1.00, indicating that there was no significant difference among aircraft accidents
based certification policy in which CFIT was listed as a cause. The interactions between
pilot flight time and time on the airframe with aircraft certification basis were also not
significant. The alternative ANCOVA results for Engine Failure were: F(2, 3) = 105.36,
p = .02, eta =.98; there was also a significant interaction between the effects of the
number of total flight time of the pilot with F(3, 3) = 59.21; p = .04, eta =.98; the
interaction  between  the  effects  of  the  number  of  hours  on  the  airplane’s  airframe  was  not  
significant. The pairwise comparison confirmed that there was a significant difference
between E-AB and Part 23/CAR 3 airplanes, and between E-AB and S-LSA/E-LSA
airplanes; however, there was not a significant difference between Part 23/CAR 3 and SLSA/E-LSA airplanes with regards to the means of the accident rates in which engine
failure was listed as a cause. The alternative ANCOVA results for Structural Failure
were : F(2, 3) = 0; p = 1, indicating that there was no significant difference among
aircraft accidents based certification policy in which Structural Failure was listed as a
cause. The interactions between pilot flight time and time on the airframe with aircraft
certification basis were also not significant.
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Qualitative Data
Text mining was utilized to analyze the qualitative portion of the NTSB accident
reports, specifically the narrative cause. Only accidents in which LOC was listed as a
cause were analyzed using text mining because LOC is the number one cause of
accidents in GA.
Text mining analysis for all aircraft certification categories in which LOC
was listed as a cause. Text mining was first conducted to analyze the narrative cause of
all aircraft categories combined—Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, and E-AB—in which
LOC was listed as a cause. A total of 1,189 narratives were analyzed. Table 20 shows a
total of 23 concepts, along with their corresponding words and frequencies. For the
purpose of the text mining analysis the S-LSA and E-LSA categories were combined.
Figure 18 shows the scree plot for the singular value decomposition analysis. The graph
indicates that the first four concepts account for more than 50% of the singular value
decomposition.
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Table 20. Singular Values and Count of Words Table for Text Mining Analysis.
Concept

Singular Value

Count

Word Root

Concept 1

74.33

686

control

Concept 2

53.66

528

stall

Concept 3

46.71

476

airspe

Concept 4

44.56

322

loss

Concept 5

41.48

280

inadvert

Concept 6

39.96

258

land

Concept 7

38.43

202

maneuv

Concept 8

37.46

189

takeoff

Concept 9

36.66

167

inadequ

Concept 10

35.34

156

subsequ

Concept 11

33.86

155

collis

Concept 12

33.26

140

due

Concept 13

32.17

135

altitud

Concept 14

31.55

135

terrain

Concept 15

31.15

129

low

Concept 16

30.71

129

wind

Concept 17

30.22

126

climb

Concept 18

29.69

122

instrument

Concept 19

29.45

120

spin

Concept 20

29.36

118

improp

Concept 21

28.60

117

decis

Concept 22

28.44

115

in-flight

Concept 23

28.18

113

aerodynam
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Figure 18. Scree plot for text mining analysis for accidents in which LOC was listed as a
cause.

Figure 19 shows the scatter plot graph for the concepts extracted from the singular
value decomposition. The scatter plot appears to have three well defined groups of words
or clusters. Figure 20 shows a closer view of cluster 1. Cluster 1 appears to have two
sub-clusters. The common words within cluster 1a are: tailwind, runway, mush, gust
high, direct, delay, recovering, bounce, speed, final, flare, maintain, delay, and inability.
This cluster appears to be associated with the take-off and landing phases of flight and
involves un-stabilized approaches during windy/gusty conditions. The words within
cluster 1b are: fog, thunderstorm, limit, known, adverse, cruise, dark, ceiling, and Visual
Flight Rules (VFR). This cluster appears to be associated with cruise conditions in which
adverse weather was a factor.
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Scatterplot of Concept 2 against Concept 1
SVD word coefficients (text_minning) in Workbook3 25v*149c
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Figure 19. Scatter plot with clusters for text mining analysis for accidents in which LOC
was listed as a cause.
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Figure 20. Detail of scatter plot with clusters for text mining analysis for accidents in
which LOC was listed as a cause.
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Cluster 2 includes the following words: instructor, failure, maintain, contributing,
factor, airspeed, stall, maneuver, and improper. This cluster is mostly associated with
maneuvering flight, in most cases involving an instructor on-board, in which the
contributing factor was failure to maintain appropriate airspeed resulting in a stall.
Cluster 3 included the words: in-flight, loss, control, weather meteorological,
instrument, condition, continued, lack, experience, plan, night, low, and ice. This cluster
is mostly associated with accidents involving flight into instrument meteorological
conditions, mostly at night in low visibility, and in many cases, in icing conditions where
planning, lack of experience and decision making was a factor.
Text mining analysis for E-AB airplanes in which LOC was listed as a cause.
A total of 266 narratives were analyzed. Figure 21 shows the scatter plot graph for the
concepts extracted from the singular value decomposition. The scatter plot appears to
have three well defined clusters of words. Cluster 1 includes the words undetermined
and takeoff. A closer look into the narratives that include these words reveal that this
cluster refers to mostly accidents during the takeoff phase of flight that resulted in a stall
and spin due to undetermined reasons. Cluster 2 includes the words: maneuver, in-flight,
collision, and terrain; a closer look into the narratives that include these words reveal that
6.25% of the E-AB accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause involved low altitude
maneuvering and 7.8% of the E-AB accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause
involved aerobatics. Cluster  3  included  the  words:  land,  aerodynamic,  stall  spin,  pilot’s  
failure to maintain, airspeed, lack, and inadvertent. This cluster is mostly associated with
accidents  involving  the  landing  phase  of  flight  in  which  the  pilot’s  failure  to  maintain  
adequate airspeed resulted in a stall and spin.
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Scatterplot of Concept 2 against Concept 1
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Figure 21. Scatter plot with clusters for text mining analysis for E-AB airplane accidents
in which LOC was listed as a cause.

Text mining analysis for LSA airplanes in which LOC was listed as a cause.
A total of 75 narratives were analyzed. Figure 22 shows the scatter plot graph for the
concepts extracted from the singular value decomposition. The scatter plot appears to
have two well defined clusters of words. Cluster 1 includes the words take-off, land,
climb, student, instructor, and loss. This cluster is mostly associated with accidents
involving the take-off, landing, and climb phases of flight involving instructional flight.
Cluster 2 includes the words maneuver, airspeed, stall, aerodynamic, and inadvertent.
This cluster is mostly associated with accidents involving maneuvers in which low
airspeeds resulted in inadvertent aerodynamic stalls.
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Figure 22. Scatter plot with clusters for text mining analysis for LSA airplane accidents
in which LOC was listed as a cause.

Text mining analysis for CAR 3 airplanes in which LOC was listed as a
cause. A total of 618 narratives were analyzed. Figure 23 shows the scatter plot graph
for the concepts extracted from the singular value decomposition. The scatter plot
appears to have two well defined clusters of words. Cluster 1 includes the words: takeoff, landing, stall, rudder, turbulence, departure, personnel, system, and maintenance.
This cluster is mostly associated with accidents involving, take-offs, landings, systems,
and maintenance issues. Cluster 2 includes the words cruise, weather, special,
disorientation, non-instrument, continued, night inadequate, lack, experience, decision,
and dark (see Figures 24 and 25). After analyzing the narratives that contained the most
important concepts, this cluster is mostly associated with accidents involving bad

112
weather, low visibility at night, and non-instrument rated pilots in VFR flight into IMC
conditions.
Scatterplot of Concept 2 against Concept 1
SVD word coefficients (LOC_CAR3.sta) in Workbook1 3v*137c
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Figure 23. Scatter plot with clusters for text mining analysis for CAR 3 airplane
accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause.
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Figure 24. Detail of scatter plot with clusters for text mining analysis for CAR 3 airplane
accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause.
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Figure 25. Detail of weather related clusters for text mining analysis for CAR 3 airplane
accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause.

Text mining analysis for Part 23 airplanes in which LOC was listed as a
cause. A total of 196 narratives were analyzed. Figure 26 shows the scatter plot graph
for the concepts extracted from the singular value decomposition. The scatter plot
appears to have two well defined clusters of words. Cluster 1 includes the words
take-off, land, decision, maneuver, inadvertent low altitude, and decision. This cluster is
mostly associated with accidents involving take-off, go-around, landing phases of flight,
and low altitude maneuvering involving inadvertent spins in which  the  pilots’  decision  
making was a contributing factor. Over 9% of the accidents involved low altitude
maneuvers. Cluster 2 includes the words special, disorientation, and instrument. This
cluster is mostly associated with spatial disorientation in instrument meteorological
conditions.
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Scatterplot of Concept 2 against Concept 1
SVD word coefficients (text_minning) in Workbook2 4v*16c
Concept 2 = -0.0077+0.4021*x
0.04
stall

airspe
0.02
takeoff

0.00

Concept 2

inadvert

land
go-around

spin

subsequ

maneuv
altitud
low

decis
-0.02

disorient
spatial

instrument

-0.04

-0.06

-0.08
0.000

flight

0.005

0.010

0.015

0.020

0.025

0.030

0.035

Concept 1

Figure 26. Scatter plot with clusters for text mining analysis for Part 23 airplane
accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause.

After conducting text mining analysis by certification basis for LOC accidents,
the results indicated that E-AB and LSA airplanes did not have clusters of words
associated with low visibility, poor weather conditions, and VFR into IMC. LSA
airplanes indicated that some LOC accidents involved instruction during take-offs and
landings. Part 23 category had a cluster of words associated with spatial disorientation
and instrument flight. CAR 3 category had a cluster associated with low visibility, poor
weather conditions, night, and VFR into IMC conditions.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of this study was to analyze the frequency of GA airplane accidents
and accident rates on the basis of aircraft certification to determine whether or not
differences in aircraft certification rules had an influence on accidents. In addition, the
narrative cause descriptions contained within the accident reports were analyzed to
determine whether there were differences in the qualitative data for the different
certification categories. The certification categories examined were: Part 23, CAR 3,
LSA, and E-AB. The accident causes examined were those listed as: LOC, CFIT, Engine
Failure, and Structural Failure in the time period between January 1, 2004, and December
31, 2011. The study concentrated on analyzing accidents involving GA fixed-wing,
single-engine, reciprocating-piston airplanes. The study employed a mixed methods
analysis that used an explanatory sequential design, consisting of two phases. The first
phase  encompassed  the  collection  and  analysis  of  quantitative  data  to  address  the  study’s  
hypotheses. The second phase consisted of the analysis of the qualitative data from the
narrative section of the accident investigation reports utilizing text mining techniques.
Discussion
The Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA, E-LSA, and E-AB airworthiness certification
categories were selected because they represent a wide spectrum of government oversight
as it relates to aircraft certification. Part 23 rules began with the initial set of simpler
design standards and have progressed into a very comprehensive and strict set of rules
that have evolved to address the safety issues of the more complex airplanes within the
Part 23 category. E-AB airplanes have the least amount of government oversight with
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regards to aircraft certification. The LSA category is a newer category that utilizes
consensus standards for its certification approval process. Because it would involve a
lengthy and expensive re-certification process, CAR 3 airplanes, designed and
manufactured under a simpler set of rules, have not been retrofitted or modified to take
advantage of new safety enhancing technologies. The GA fleet is comprised of over
200,000 airplanes with an average age of 40 years (FAA, 2009).
Population and sample. The population for the study consisted of all U.S. fixedwing, single-engine, reciprocating-piston airplanes with maximum certificated takeoff
weights of less than 12,500 pounds. The sample consisted of accidents of single-engine
piston fixed-wing airplanes with maximum certificated takeoff weights of less than
12,500 pounds. The airworthiness certification categories included in the sample were:
(a) standard category, which also includes normal, utility and aerobatic; (b) LSA; and
(c) amateur-built airplanes within the experimental category. The airworthiness
categories excluded from the sample were: limited, restricted, special flight, provisional,
transport, and unknown. The time period selected was based on the creation of the LSA
category in 2004; LSA airplanes began production in 2005.
A total of 6,455 accidents met the initial airworthiness certification criteria of this
study. The total number of accidents involving LOC, CFIT, Engine Failure, or Structural
Failure were 3,023 (see Table 8). These accidents were utilized for the analyses to
address the hypotheses. The sample consisted of: 1,155 LOC accidents, 563 CFIT
accidents, 973 Engine Failure accidents, and 332 Structural Failure accidents. The
number of accidents by certification category were: 1,786 accidents for CAR 3,
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450 accidents for Part 23, 648 accidents for E-AB, 73 accidents for S-LSA, and
66 accidents for E-LSA.
Hypothesis testing. The evaluation of eight hypotheses under investigation was
conducted utilizing two main statistical methods: Chi-Square test and ANCOVA.
Discussion of the statistical significance of the hypotheses follows.
To address hypotheses one through four Chi-Square tests were performed to
determine whether the different causes of accidents were distributed differently across
certification basis categories; therefore, the null hypotheses were: there is no significant
difference in the frequency of accidents among airplanes certified under Part 23, CAR 3,
S-LSA/E-LSA or E-AB in which LOC, CFIT, Engine Failure, or Structural Failure was
listed as a cause between the years of 2004 and 2011. Since only the accident
frequencies were utilized for the Chi-Square test, the amount of activity or number of
active airplanes for each category were not taken into account. The Chi-Square test
compares the observed and expected frequencies; the test determines if the expected
values differ significantly from the observed values. The standardized residuals show the
difference between the expected frequencies and the observed frequencies. The
individual standardized residuals provide very useful information about the contribution
of each of the expected and observed frequencies to the overall association that the
Chi-Square statistic measures (Field, 2009). Appendix Tables C7-C10 show the
standardized residuals for the Chi-Square tests for each of the accident causes.
H01. The null hypothesis tested was that there is no significant difference in the
frequency of accidents among airplanes certified under Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA,
or E-AB categories with regard to accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause. The
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Chi-Square test indicated that there was a significant difference in the frequency of
accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause. The post-hoc analysis indicated that the
significant difference was among Part 23, CAR 3, and E-AB categories; however, it
indicated no significant difference in the frequency of accidents among the
S-LSA/E-LSA category for LOC accidents (see Appendix Table C1). The standardized
residuals also indicated that the CAR 3 and S-LSA/E-LSA categories had significant
difference in frequencies; the Part 23 and E-AB categories did not have any significant
residuals.
H02. The null hypothesis tested was that there is no significant difference in the
frequency of accidents among airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA,
or E-AB categories with regard to accidents in which CFIT was listed as a cause. The
Chi-Square test indicated that there was no significant difference in the frequency of
accidents in which CFIT was listed as a cause.
H03. The null hypothesis tested was that there is no significant difference in the
frequency of accidents among airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA,
or E-AB categories with regard to accidents in which Engine Failure was listed as a
cause. The Chi-Square test indicated that there was a significant difference in the
frequency of accidents in which Engine Failure was listed as a cause.
H04. The null hypothesis tested was that there is no significant difference in the
frequency of accidents among airplanes certified in the Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA,
or E-AB categories with regard to accidents in which Structural Failure was listed as a
cause. The Chi-Square test indicated that there was no significant difference in the
frequency of accidents in which Structural Failure was listed as a cause.
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To address hypotheses five through eight a series of one-way factorial ANCOVA
tests with covariates (ANCOVAs) was performed to determine whether there is a
significant difference in the accident rates among airplanes certified under Part
23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB in which LOC, CFIT, Engine Failure, or Structural
Failure was listed as a cause after controlling for pilot flight time and number of hours on
the  aircraft’s  airframe.    Therefore, the null hypotheses were: there is no significant
difference in the accident rate among airplanes certified under Part 23/CAR 3, SLSA/E-LSA, or E-AB in which LOC, CFIT, Engine Failure, or Structural Failure was
listed as a cause. The CAR 3 and Part 23 categories were combined in one group and the
S-LSA and E-LSA categories were combined in another group for this analysis as the
total hours per year used to calculate the accident rate were only available for the
combined categories.
H05. The null hypothesis tested was that there is no significant difference in the
accident rate among airplanes certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB,
with regard to accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause. The ANCOVA test
indicated that there was no significant difference in the accidents rate among airplanes
certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA or E-AB, with regard to accidents in which
LOC was listed as a cause.
H06. The null hypothesis tested was that there is no significant difference in the
accident rate among airplanes certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB,
with regard to accidents in which CFIT was listed as a cause. The ANCOVA test
indicated that there was no significant difference in the accidents rate among airplanes
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certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB, with regard to accidents in
which CFIT was listed as a cause.
H07. The null hypothesis tested was that there is no significant difference in the
accident rate among airplanes certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB,
with regard to accidents in which Engine Failure was listed as a cause. The ANCOVA
test indicated that there was a significant difference in the accidents rate among airplanes
certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB, with regard to accidents in
which Engine Failure was listed as a cause. There was also a significant interaction
between the certification basis and the effects of the number of total flight time of the
pilot; there was no significant interaction between certification basis and the number of
hours  on  the  airplane’s  airframe. The pair-wise post-hoc analysis indicated that there
were significant differences were between E-AB and Part 23/CAR 3 airplanes, and
between E-AB and S-LSA/E-LSA airplanes; however, there was not a significant
difference between Part 23/CAR 3 and S-LSA/E-LSA airplanes with regards to the
means of the accident rates in which Engine Failure was listed as a cause.
H08. The null hypothesis tested was that there is no significant difference in the
accident rate among airplanes certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB,
with regard to accidents in which Structural Failure was listed as a cause. The ANCOVA
test indicated that there was no significant difference in the accidents rate among
airplanes certified in the Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB, with regard to
accidents in which Structural Failure was listed as a cause.
Text mining. Text mining was used to analyze the narrative causes of accident
reports. Only the narrative causes of accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause were

121
analyzed. The first analysis of accidents in which LOC was listed as a cause for all
aircraft certification categories indicated three main groups of words or clusters. The first
cluster was associated with LOC during take-offs and landings, the second cluster was
associated with maneuvering flight, and the third cluster was associated with low
visibility, degraded weather conditions, and VFR flight into IMC. Accidents involving
Part 23 category had a cluster of words associated with spatial disorientation and
instrument flight. The CAR 3 category had a cluster associated with low visibility, poor
weather conditions, night, and VFR flight into IMC conditions. The E-AB and LSA
airplanes did not have any clusters of words associated with low visibility, poor weather
conditions, and VFR flight into IMC.
Conclusions
The results of the study indicated that GA aircraft certification rules do not have a
statistically significant effect on the frequency of CFIT accidents or the accident rate.
Based on the literature, CFIT fatal accidents have dropped 60% between 2001 and 2010
(GAJSC, 2012). This decrease in the number of CFIT accidents is attributed mainly to
electronic devices, mainly in the form of handheld equipment, that have made a
considerable contribution in the reduction of pilot workload (GAJSC, 2012).
The results of the study indicated that GA aircraft certification rules have a
statistically significant effect on the frequency of LOC accidents but not on the accident
rate. LOC accounted for 1,155 accidents, an accident rate of 0.99 per 100,000 hours
flown, or 18% of all the accidents between 2004 and 2011, and is the number one cause
of accidents in GA. These results are consistent with previous studies and support the
need to focus on LOC prevention for GA to reduce the overall frequency of GA accidents
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and the accident rate (GAO, 2012; GAJSC, 2012; NTSB, 2012b). Airplanes certified
under CAR 3 rules accounted for 53.5%, or 618 of the accidents in which LOC was listed
as a cause and also accounted for 62.65% of the total accidents between 2004 and 2011.
The text mining analysis of the qualitative portion of the accident reports showed
that CAR 3 airplanes, unlike the other categories, were involved in LOC accidents
associated with low visibility, poor weather conditions, night, and VFR flight into IMC
conditions. CAR 3 airplanes were designed and manufactured prior to the 1960s and are
the oldest airplanes of the GA fleet. CAR 3 airplanes in most cases, have not been
retrofitted to take advantage of the newer technologies that could possibly aid in the
prevention of LOC accidents. According to the literature, LOC accidents at night and in
IMC would drop by 50% simply by installing autopilots in the more than 100,000 IFR
capable GA airplanes (GAJSC, 2012).
The results of the study indicated that GA aircraft certification rules have a
statistically significant effect on the frequency of Engine Failure accidents and the
accident rate. The results of the study also indicated that there was a significant
difference in the accident rate of Engine Failure accidents between E-AB and
Part 23/CAR 3, and between E-AB and S LSA/E LSA airplanes; however, there was not
a significant difference between airplanes certified under S-LSA/E-LSA or
Part 23/CAR 3. As found in the literature, many of the Engine Failure accidents in the
E-AB category occur during the first few hours of operation of a newly built aircraft or
shortly after being purchased by a new owner; the majority of these accidents are due to

design and installation problems with the engine and fuel systems (NTSB, 2012b). The
majority of E-AB airplanes are built from commercially available kits rather than from
plans or original designs (NTSB, 2012b). As explained in the literature, a primary focus
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of the FAA regulations that oversee the E-AB building process seeks to ensure that the
majority of the construction of the airplane is performed by the builder (NTSB, 2012b).
Airworthiness certificates are granted to the builder of an E-AB aircraft builder by the
FAA based on the review of the paperwork and a one-time inspection of the airplane
once  the  airplane  has  been  completed  (NTSB,  2012b).    A  functional  test  of  the  airplane’s  
fuel system is required by civil aviation authorities in other countries but it is not required
by the FAA (NTSB, 2012b).
The results of this study indicate that the average pilot flight times did not differ
substantially among the different certification categories; this result is supported by the
literature. On the other hand, the literature also indicates that pilots of E-AB accident
aircraft, on average, had considerably less flight experience in the make and model of
E-AB airplane (NTSB, 2012b). E-AB aircraft are not allowed to be operated for
compensation or hire, which includes flight instruction; therefore, the difficulty of finding
suitable E-AB aircraft and instructors available for training presents a barrier to pilots
seeking transition training (NTSB, 2012b).
The results of the study indicated that GA aircraft certification rules do not have a
statistically significant effect on the frequency of Structural Failure accidents or the
accident rate. Structural Failure is one of the failures or malfunctions that aircraft
certification is designed to prevent. Structural Failure is not one of the leading causes of
accidents in GA, and based on the results of this study, Structural Failure accidents
accounted for 332 accidents, an accident rate of 0.30 per 100,000 hours flown, or 5% of
all the accidents between 2004 and 2011. Therefore, it appears that regardless of the
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amount of government oversight with regards to certification, the FAA has been able to
minimize the amount of accidents due to Structural Failure.
In summary, GA aircraft certification rules do not have a statistically significant
effect on aircraft accidents except on the frequency of LOC accidents, and on the
frequency and accident rate of Engine Failure accidents. With respect to LOC accidents,
it appears that government oversight could have become an obstacle in the
implementation and installation of new safety enhancing equipment into old aircraft that
could possibly reduce the number of LOC accidents. With respect to Engine Failure
accidents, aircraft certification oversight within the E-AB category is precluding E-AB
aircraft owners from being able to receive flight instruction and becoming proficient in
specific E-AB models, and also from allowing professional organizations to complete and
flight test their E-AB airplanes. On the other hand, government oversight should focus
on ensuring that E-AB aircraft owners perform a functional test before obtaining an
airworthiness certificate. A functional test could prevent some of the Engine Failure
accidents that occur in the first few hours of operation of E-AB airplanes.
Recommendations
The results of this study indicate that there is a significant difference in the
frequency of accidents and the accident rate among E-AB and the other two major
categories: (a) Part23/CAR 3, and (b) S-LSA/E-LSA for accidents in which Engine
Failure was listed as a cause. Based on the literature and the results of this study, the
FAA’s  oversight  emphasis  on  E-AB aircraft should be shifted to allow E-AB aircraft to
be completed and flight tested by professional organizations, thereby reducing some of
the accidents due to installation and flight test errors. The FAA should also consider
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allowing transition flight training in E-AB aircraft; thereby increasing pilot proficiency in
specific types of E-AB airplanes. In addition, to reduce Engine Failure accidents in
E-AB aircraft, the  FAA  should  require  a  functional  test  of  the  airplane’s  systems,  
including the fuel system, before the airworthiness certificate is issued to the builder
(NTSB, 2012b).
To reduce the accident rate and the frequency of LOC accidents in GA it seems
important to focus on the airplanes certified under CAR 3 rules for three reasons:
(a) CAR 3 airplanes consist of the oldest airplanes of the GA fleet; (b) CAR 3 airplanes
were designed and manufactured prior to the 1960s, and in most cases, have not been
retrofitted to take advantage of the newer technologies; and (c) the text mining analysis
showed that CAR 3 airplanes were involved in LOC accidents associated with poor
weather conditions and VFR flight into IMC conditions. The use of AOA indicators and
autopilots to prevent LOC accidents should be assessed. The FAA should facilitate the
retrofit of the legacy fleet with safety enhancing technology if this technology proves to
be helpful in the prevention of LOC accidents.
As indicated by the text mining analysis of the narrative cause of the accident
reports, the aircraft within each category are operated differently and have various needs;
therefore, to reduce the number of LOC accidents in GA, each aircraft certification
category needs to be addressed differently. The words found within each of the text
mining clusters have indicated the emphasis areas where additional training, technology,
or awareness should be placed to reduce LOC accidents. As seen in Table 11, the CAR 3
airplanes have on average the largest number of hours on the airframe; however, the
average pilot flight times do not differ substantially among any of the categories. As
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suggested in the literature, retrofitting these older airplanes to take advantage of new
technologies might help in the reduction of LOC accidents. Based on the clusters of
words revealed in the text mining analysis, the areas of emphasis to reduce LOC
accidents among CAR 3 airplanes should be: (a) avoiding VFR flight into IMC,
(b) aeronautical decision making, (c) pre-flight planning, and (d) traffic pattern work
especially during instructional flights. To reduce LOC accidents among Part 23
airplanes, the areas of emphasis should be: (a) traffic pattern work especially during
instructional flights, and (b) spatial disorientation in instrument conditions. To reduce
LOC accidents among the E-AB airplanes, the areas of emphasis should be: (a) take-off,
(b) landings, (c) maneuvering flight, and (d) low altitude maneuvering. To reduce LOC
accidents among the LSA airplanes, the areas of emphasis should include: (a) traffic
pattern work especially during instructional flights, and (b) maneuvering flight.
Advocacy groups like EAA and ASTM could be approached to disseminate information
and conduct specialized training for each particular category, such as E-AB and LSA.
The adoption of consensus standards for GA aircraft certification could be an
appealing alternative. Applying consensus standards has the potential of simplifying the
retrofit of the legacy fleet of GA airplanes to encourage the installation of safety
enhancements in a timely and economically viable way. As supported by the literature, a
risk management approach should be taken to analyze whether the current certification
regulations are actually an obstacle to installing safety enhancing technology into the GA
fleet (GAJSC, 2012). Installing autopilots and AOA indicators on a certified airplane
could cost between five to ten times more than installing these devices on an
experimental airplane, which could represent between 10 to 50% of the average value of
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a GA airplane (GAJSC, 2012). The risks and benefits of installing autopilots and AOA
indicators in older aircraft without a stringent, expensive, and time consuming
certification process should be assessed.
Recommendations for future research. Future research should examine the
impact of the use of technology in the prevention of LOC accidents and also in the
improvement of aircraft crashworthiness. Some of the technologies that have been
identified in previous studies to possibly reduce LOC accidents in GA include autopilots
and AOA indicators (GAJSC, 2012). Devices like seatbelts with airbags and BRS
systems have been identified as possible means to improve aircraft crashworthiness and
survivability (FAA, 2009).
Future research should also concentrate on a risk management study to determine
the best approach to implementing new technologies into older airplanes. The study
should include the cost of the necessary changes in certification rules and the cost of the
acquisition and installation of the new equipment.
Future research might compare accidents due to LOC in which an autopilot was
available in the airplane with accidents in which an autopilot was not available in the
airplane. This study could also include a risk-benefit analysis for the installation of
autopilots in older airplanes.
Future research may also focus on the impact of AOA indicators on LOC accident
prevention. An experiment can be performed involving special training using a control
and an experimental group on the concepts of AOA and the use of AOA indicators. The
performance of identifying and preventing stalls utilizing an AOA indicator among the
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control and the experimental groups of pilots can then be compared utilizing a simulator
or a flight training device.
Additional research could focus on whether airplanes that have seatbelts and/or
airbags have better crashworthiness and survivability rates. Accidents involving BRS
devices installed in the airplanes might also be studied in order to research whether they
have a better survivability rate.
Recommendations for practice. A risk management approach to analyze
whether the current certification regulations are actually an obstacle to installing safety
enhancing technology into the GA fleet should be applied. The results from the text
mining analysis indicate that CAR 3 airplanes were involved in LOC accidents associated
with low visibility, poor weather conditions, night, and VFR flight into IMC conditions
and could benefit from installing safety enhancing equipment such as autopilots and
AOA indicators.
Additional information regarding aircraft certification rules should be added to the
NTSB database as well as a list of equipment installed on the airplanes, such as autopilots
and AOA indicators. In addition, the NTSB database should include any additional
handheld technologies that were being used, such as an electronic tablet, mobile
telephone, or GPS. The number of active aircraft and number of hours flown per year
should also be grouped and available by certification basis in order to have more
information available for future research. The number of hours on the engine should also
be added to the NTSB accident report database.
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Table B1. Variables Utilized in the Study.

NTSB Variable Name

Variable Description

Access Table
Name
ev_id
Event identification number
aircraft
Regis_no
Aircraft registration number
aircraft
Ntsb_no
NTSB accident number
aircraft
damage
Type of damage
aircraft
Acft_make
Aircraft make
aircraft
Acft_model
Aircraft model
aircraft
Cert_max_gr_wt
Maximum certificated gross weight
aircraft
Homebuilt
Is the airplane homebuilt?
aircraft
Total_seats
Total number of seats
aircraft
fixed_retractable
Fixed or retractable landing gear
aircraft
Afm_hrs
Number of hours on airframe
aircraft
Acft_awy_cert
Aircraft airworthiness certificate
Dt_aircraft
Crew_cert_code
Crew certificate code
Dt_flight_crew
Crew_cert_instruct
Flight instructor on-board?
Dt_flight_crew
Engine_type
Type of engine
engine
Engine_mfgr
Engine manufacturer
engine
Eng_model
Engine model
engine
Power_units
Units for engine power
engine
Hp_or_lbs
Horse-power or pounds?
engine
Carb_fuel_injection
Carbureted or fuel injected?
engine
Ev_type
Type of event
events
Ev_year
Year of event
events
Ev_month
Month of event
events
Occurrence_code
Occurrence code
Event_sequence
Occurrence_description Occurrence description
Event_sequence
Flight_hours
Pilot total number of hours
Flight_time
Narr_cause
Cause narrative
narratives
Note: The data was filtered for only: Part 91 operations; aircraft category: airplanes;
maximum certificated gross weight under 12,500 pounds; U.S. registered aircraft only;
single-engine; reciprocating (far_part 091; acft_category: AIR; Cert_max_gr_wt:
<12,500, Acft_reg_cls:USUS, Num_eng: 1, Engine_type: recip).
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Table B2. NTSB Occurrences Codes.

NTSB

NTSB Description

Common Name

Codes
250

LOSS OF CONTROL - IN FLIGHT

LOC

220

IN FLIGHT COLLISION WITH OBJECT

CFIT

350

LOSS OF ENGINE POWER

Engine Failure

130

AIRFRAME/COMPONENT/SYSTEM
Structural Failure
FAILURE/MALFUNCTION (including in-flight
breakup)
Note. NTSB codes found on the Occurrences table/Occurrence code Adapted from
“Aviation Accident Database”, by NTSB, 2013.
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APPENDIX C
Tables
C1

Chi-Square Test by Certification Basis.

C2

Accident Rate and Information Used for Analysis of Variance

C3

Accident Rate and Information Used for Analysis of Variance for LOC
Accidents in Groups of Two Years

C4

Accident Rate and Information Used for Analysis of Variance for CFIT
Accidents in Groups of Two Years

C5

Accident Rate and Information Used for Analysis of Variance for Engine
Failure Accidents in Groups of Two Years

C6

Accident Rate and Information Used for Analysis of Variance for
Structural Failure Accidents in Groups of Two Years

C7

Counts, Expected Counts and Residuals for Chi-Square Test for LOC
Accidents

C8

Counts, Expected Counts, and Residuals for Chi-Square Test for CFIT
Accidents

C9

Counts, Expected Counts, and Residuals for Chi-Square Test for Engine
Failure Accidents

C10

Counts, Expected Counts, and Residuals for Chi-Square Test for
Structural Failure Accidents
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Table C1. Chi-Square Test by Certification Basis.
Certification Basis
CAR 3
Pearson
Chi-Square
Likelihood
Ratio
N of Valid
Cases
E-AB
Pearson
Chi-Square
Likelihood
Ratio
N of Valid
Cases
S-LSA/E-LSA Pearson
Chi-Square
Likelihood
Ratio
N of Valid
Cases
PART 23
Pearson
Chi-Square
Likelihood
Ratio
N of Valid
Cases

Value
104.58

9

Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
.000

9

.000

41.49

9

.000

42.65

9

.000

8.16c

9

.518

11.03

9

.273

43.22

9

.000

43.15

9

.000

111.64

df

1,786

648

139

450
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Table C2. Accident Rate and Information Used for Analysis of Variance.
No. of
Accidents
Years

Cert.
Basis

Accident
Rate

Av.
Pilot
Flt
Time

Av. A/C
Airframe
Time

Hours Flown

No of
Active A/C

15,363,000

146,613

764

4.97E-05

2,774

3,916

0

0

0

0

0

0

990,000

19,165

149

1.51E-04

3,341

868

13,739,000

148,101

691

5.03E-05

2,787

4,204

9,000

170

3

3.33E-04

1,654

58

987,000

19,817

156

1.58E-04

3,221

366

13,976,000

145,036

612

4.38E-05

2,321

4,305

2004

Part 23

2004

LSA

2004

E-AB

2005

Part 23

2005

LSA

2005

E-AB

2006

Part 23

2006

LSA

66,000

1,273

12

1.82E-04

2,171

183

2006

E-AB

899,000

19,316

120

1.33E-04

3,679

326

2007

Part 23

13,571,000

147,569

637

4.69E-05

2,707

4,145

2007

LSA

260,000

6,066

36

1.38E-04

3,390

265

2007

E-AB

896,000

19,538

135

1.51E-04

3,313

312

2008

Part 23

12,746,000

145,497

577

4.53E-05

2,627

4,510

2008

LSA

293,000

6,811

49

1.67E-04

2,236

296

2008

E-AB

872,000

19,767

134

1.54E-04

2,728

320

2009

Part 23

11,730,000

140,649

607

5.17E-05

2,718

4,320

2009

LSA

286,000

6,547

56

1.96E-04

2,916

329

2009

E-AB

983,000

20,794

148

1.51E-04

4,007

402

2010

Part 23

12,151,000

139,519

605

4.98E-05

3,100

4,408

2010

LSA

311,000

6,528

42

1.35E-04

2,998

270

2010

E-AB

911,000

21,270

127

1.39E-04

3,140

307

2011

Part 23

13,574,031

184,706

589

4.34E-05

3,214

4,351

2011

LSA

356,539

8,967

60

1.68E-04

2,427

583

2011

E-AB

854,719

29,180

146

1.71E-04

3,474

408
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Table C3. Accident Rate and Information Used for Analysis of Variance for LOC
Accidents in Groups of Two Years.
Years

Cert.
Basis

No. Acc.

04/05

Part 23

271

06/07

Part 23

08/09

Hours Flown

No Active
A/C

Acc. Rate
with hrs
flown

Acc. Rate
with no.
A/C

Av.
Pilot
Flt.
Time

Av.
Airframe
hrs

29,102,000

294,714

9.31E-06

9.31E-06

2,31

3,96

232

27,547,000

292,605

8.42E-06

8.42E-06

4,38

3,91

Part 23

162

24,476,000

286,146

6.62E-06

6.62E-06

2,51

3,66

10/11

Part 23

149

25,725,031

324,225

5.79E-06

5.79E-06

2,26

4,52

04/05

LSA

1

9,000

170

1.11E-04

1.11E-04

2,99

90

06/07

LSA

17

326,000

7,339

5.21E-05

5.21E-05

26,70

111

08/09

LSA

25

579,000

13,358

4.32E-05

4.32E-05

2,83

634

10/11

LSA

32

667,539

15,495

4.79E-05

4.79E-05

1,38

362

04/05

E-AB

82

1,977,000

38,982

4.15E-05

4.15E-05

2,55

415

06/07

E-AB

72

1,795,000

38,854

4.01E-05

4.01E-05

5,34

335

08/09

E-AB

67

1,855,000

40,561

3.61E-05

3.61E-05

2,14

355

10/11

E-AB

45

1,765,719

50,450

2.55E-05

2.55E-05

2,58

375
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Table C4. Accident Rate and Information Used for Analysis of Variance for CFIT
Accidents in Groups of Two Years.
Years

Cert.
Basis

No.
Acc.

04/05

Part 23

203

06/07

Part 23

08/09

Hours
Flown

Acc. Rate
with hrs
flown
6.98E-06

Acc. Rate
with no. A/C

29,102,000

No
Active
A/C
294,714

6.98E-06

Av. Pilot
Flt.
Time
3,055

Av.
Airframe
hrs
4,204

169

27,547,000

292,605

6.13E-06

6.13E-06

5,287

4,409

Part 23

75

24,476,000

286,146

3.06E-06

3.06E-06

3,091

4,276

10/11

Part 23

34

25,725,031

324,225

1.32E-06

1.32E-06

2,578

3,425

04/05

LSA

0

9,000

170

0

0

0

0

06/07

LSA

3

326,000

7,339

9.20E-06

9.20E-06

2,135

323

08/09

LSA

4

579,000

13,358

6.91E-06

6.91E-06

427

90

10/11

LSA

0

667,539

15,495

0.00E+00

0.00E+00

0

0

04/05

E-AB

39

1,977,000

38,982

1.97E-05

1.97E-05

3,097

710

06/07

E-AB

18

1,795,000

38,854

1.00E-05

1.00E-05

2,666

271

08/09

E-AB

14

1,855,000

40,561

7.55E-06

7.55E-06

1,841

284

10/11

E-AB

4

1,765,719

50,450

2.27E-06

2.27E-06

1,870

674
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Table C5. Accident Rate and Information Used for Analysis of Variance for Engine
Failure Accidents in Groups of Two Years.
Years

Cert.
Basis

04/05

Part 23

06/07

No.
Acc.

Hours Flown

No Active
A/C

Acc. Rate
with hrs
flown

Acc. Rate
with no.
A/C

Av. Pilot
Flt. Time

Av.
Airframe
hrs

82

29,102,000

294,714

2.82E-06

2.82E-06

4,055

4,126

Part 23

57

27,547,000

292,605

2.07E-06

2.07E-06

7,250

4,414

08/09

Part 23

53

24,476,000

286,146

2.17E-06

2.17E-06

3,615

4,311

10/11

Part 23

35

25,725,031

324,225

1.36E-06

1.36E-06

4,584

3,797

04/05

LSA

0

9,000

170

0

0

0

0

06/07

LSA

7

326,000

7,339

2.15E-05

2.15E-05

3,280

322

08/09

LSA

14

579,000

13,358

2.42E-05

2.42E-05

2,892

232

10/11

LSA

22

667,539

15,495

3.30E-05

3.30E-05

6,845

1,031

04/05

E-AB

37

1,977,000

38,982

1.87E-05

1.87E-05

3,150

389

06/07

E-AB

46

1,795,000

38,854

2.56E-05

2.56E-05

8,112

261

08/09

E-AB

45

1,158,000

26,314

3.89E-05

3.89E-05

1,946

300

10/11

E-AB

60

1,765,719

50,450

3.40E-05

3.40E-05

3,076

311

146
Table C6. Accident Rate and Information Used for Analysis of Variance for Structural
Failure Accidents in Groups of Two Years.
Years

Cert.
Basis

No.
Acc.

Hours Flown

No Active A/C

Acc. Rate
with hrs
flown

Acc. Rate
with no.
A/C

Av.
Pilot
Flt.
Time

Av.
Airframe
hrs

04/05

Part 23

82

29,102,000

294,714

2.82E-06

2.82E-06

4055

4,126

06/07

Part 23

57

2,7547,000

292,605

2.07E-06

2.07E-06

7250

4,414

08/09

Part 23

53

2,4476,000

286,146

2.17E-06

2.17E-06

3615

4,311

10/11

Part 23

35

25,725,031

324,225

1.36E-06

1.36E-06

4584

3,797

04/05

LSA

0

9,000

170

0

0

0

0

06/07

LSA

3

326,000

7,339

9.20E-06

9.20E-06

9785

1,221

08/09

LSA

6

579,000

13,358

1.04E-05

1.04E-05

994

100

10/11

LSA

5

667,539

15,495

7.49E-06

7.49E-06

2158

91

04/05

E-AB

24

19,77,000

38,982

1.21E-05

1.21E-05

3979

1,506

06/07

E-AB

22

1,795000

38,854

1.23E-05

1.23E-05

6153

257

08/09

E-AB

13

1,276,000

27,605

1.02E-05

1.02E-05

3258

436

10/11

E-AB

23

1,765,719

50,450

1.30E-05

1.30E-05

5474

337
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Table C7. Counts, Expected Counts, and Residuals for Chi-Square Test for LOC
Accidents.
Years
2004-2005

CAR3 E-AB
Count

1

49

354

189.4

81.5

23.0

60.1

354.0

32.6

.5

-22.0

-11.1

Std. Residual

2.4

.1

-4.6

-1.4

Count

164

72

17

68

321

171.8

73.9

20.8

54.5

321.0

-7.8

-1.9

-3.8

13.5

-.6

-.2

-.8

1.8

114

67

25

48

254

Expected Count

135.9

58.5

16.5

43.1

254.0

Residual

-21.9

8.5

8.5

4.9

Std. Residual

-1.9

1.1

2.1

.7

Count

118

45

32

31

226

120.9

52.0

14.7

38.4

226.0

-2.9

-7.0

17.3

-7.4

-.3

-1.0

4.5

-1.2

Expected Count
Residual
Std. Residual

2010-2011

Total

82

Residual

2008-2009

PART23

222

Expected Count

2006-2007

LSA

Count

Expected Count
Residual
Std. Residual
Total Count

618

266

75

196

1155
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Table C8. Counts, Expected Counts, and Residuals for Chi-Square Test for CFIT
Accidents.
Years
2004-2005

CAR3 E-AB
Count

242

0

30

174.1

32.2

3.0

32.7

-1.1

6.8

-3.0

-2.7

-.1

1.2

-1.7

-.5
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18

3

25

136.7

25.3

2.4

25.6

7.3

-7.3

.6

-.6

Std. Residual

.6

-1.5

.4

-.1

Count

61

14

4

14

Expected Count

66.9

12.4

1.2

12.6

Residual

-5.9

1.6

2.8

1.4

Std. Residual

-.7

.5

2.6

.4

Count

27

4

0

7

27.3

5.1

.5

5.1

Residual

-.3

-1.1

-.5

1.9

Std. Residual

-.1

-.5

-.7

.8

Std. Residual
Count
Expected Count
Residual

2010-2011

Total

39

Residual

2008-2009

PART23

173

Expected Count

2006-2007

LSA

Expected Count

Total Count

405

75

7

76

190

93

38

563
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Table C9. Counts, Expected Counts, and Residuals for Chi-Square Test for Engine
Failure Accidents.
Years
2004-2005

CAR3 E-AB
Count

0

24

226

136.3

50.2

10.0

29.5

226.0

21.7

-6.2

-10.0

-5.5

Std. Residual

1.9

-.9

-3.2

-1.0

Count

126

46

7

19

198

119.5

44.0

8.8

25.8

198.0

6.5

2.0

-1.8

-6.8

.6

.3

-.6

-1.3

141

66

14

42

263

Expected Count

158.7

58.4

11.6

34.3

263.0

Residual

-17.7

7.6

2.4

7.7

Std. Residual

-1.4

1.0

.7

1.3

Count

162

60

22

42

286

Expected Count

172.5

63.5

12.6

37.3

286.0

Residual

-10.5

-3.5

9.4

4.7

-.8

-.4

2.6

.8

Expected Count
Residual
Std. Residual

2010-2011

Total

44

Residual

2008-2009

PART23

158

Expected Count

2006-2007

LSA

Count

Std. Residual
Total Count

587

216

43

127

973
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Table C10. Counts, Expected Counts, and Residuals for Chi-Square Test for Structural
Failure Accidents.
Years
2004-2005

CAR3 E-AB
Count

0

18

106

56.2

29.1

4.5

16.3

106.0

Residual

7.8

-5.1

-4.5

1.7

Std. Residual

1.0

-.9

-2.1

.4

Count

45

22

3

12

82

43.5

22.5

3.5

12.6

82.0

1.5

-.5

-.5

-.6

Std. Residual

.2

-.1

-.2

-.2

Count

40

22

6

13

81

Expected Count

42.9

22.2

3.4

12.4

81.0

Residual

-2.9

-.2

2.6

.6

Std. Residual

-.4

.0

1.4

.2

Count

27

23

5

8

63

Expected Count

33.4

17.3

2.7

9.7

63.0

Residual

-6.4

5.7

2.3

-1.7

Std. Residual

-1.1

1.4

1.4

-.5

Residual

2010-2011

Total

24

Expected Count

2008-2009

PART23

64

Expected Count

2006-2007

LSA

Total Count

176

91

14

51

332

